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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 The determinants of success in venture capital financing are explored in this manuscript. 
1247 venture capital funds formed over a twenty-year time period are empirically analyzed with 
results that support theoretical research from extant finance and economics literature. Venture 
capitalists’ choices of portfolio size, distance from portfolio firms, location, and to some extent, 
level of diversification in their investment portfolio, are all significant factors in explaining the 
success rates of venture capital funds. These results are robust even when controlling for other 
characteristics of venture funds and entrepreneurial firms, such as the stage of development and 
industry of the portfolio firms, which may affect success rates of venture capitalist portfolios. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 To most people outside of the industry, the realm of venture capital finance is enigmatic. 
This is a consequence of the private nature of the field. Most of the venture capital investment 
activity in the United States is carried out by independent private partnerships that are under no 
obligation to publicly disseminate information regarding their investment portfolios. Thus, there 
is a lack of both aggregate and fund-level data available for research opportunities. Because of 
this lack of publicly available information, the area has not been studied to the extent of other 
disciplines in financial economics. 
While the paucity of historical data is a problem, progress has been made in the past 
couple of decades along this front. Two competing databases have been developed, 
VentureXpert by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), and VentureSource by VentureOne. 
Both are primarily designed for investors’ use, which creates problems for researchers that may 
seek a different set of information from the typical investor. Limitations of the SDC database 
will be discussed in chapter 2 of this manuscript. A more important problem for many is the 
prohibitively high cost of both databases. The VentureSource database is only available to 
qualified investors (limited partners) in private equity funds or to corporate development groups. 
While the SDC’s VentureXpert database is available for academic research on a yearly 
subscription basis, their rates are difficult to justify for most researchers.
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Having access to the VentureXpert database, I chose to analyze an aspect of venture 
capital investing that has received only cursory attention in the literature: the determinants of 
success in venture capital investing. Much of the related literature throughout the past decade has 
focused on descriptions of how venture capitalist organizations function and how their 
relationships with limited partners and entrepreneurs develop over time. In this dissertation, I 
have attempted to sort out the determinants of successful venture capital investing based upon 
much of the literature that has focused on the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship. Since 
there has been very little theoretical research on this subject, I have partitioned my analysis into 
three essays that draw upon theory from extant finance and economics literature. 
The first essay, Does Venture Capital Portfolio Size Matter?, is the only essay of the 
three that is based directly upon theoretical research within the subject of venture capital 
investing. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) develop a theoretical model suggesting that a 
trade-off exists in venture capital investing between portfolio size and the extent of the 
managerial advice that venture capitalists can offer the entrepreneurs of firms in their portfolios. 
It is not unreasonable to posit that such a trade-off exists. Venture capitalists typically take an 
active role in the management of the entrepreneurial firms in their portfolios, often sitting on the 
board of directors and usually assisting in key strategic decisions of these firms, even 
contributing to the operational decision-making process in some cases. The ramifications of such 
a trade-off are that venture capitalists face explicit costs when expanding the number of portfolio 
firms in which they choose to invest. As they commit more time to other projects, entrepreneurs 
will rationally allocate smaller shares of their firms to the venture capitalists and thereby 
decrease the returns to the venture capitalists from successful venture investments. These 
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adjustments in contract terms would result in lower returns per investment, though not 
necessarily lower returns for the entire portfolio of venture investments. 
Given the fact that the managerial advice of venture capitalists is so important to the 
entrepreneurial firms’ chances of success, it also stands to reason that the likelihood of success 
for the portfolio of firms will fall as the venture capitalists add companies to their portfolio. At 
some point, as venture capitalists add entrepreneurial firms to their portfolios, they will be forced 
to allocate less time to their existing portfolio of firms if they are to continue to increase their 
portfolio size. This issue is particularly important if macroeconomic conditions persuade limited 
partners to increase investment capital available to venture capitalists. Given additional 
investment capital, venture capitalists must choose to invest more money in each portfolio firm, 
increase the number of firms they invest in, or do both. 
I first establish that the supply of venture capitalists is not elastic. Venture capitalists 
have a unique skill set, and typically a network of contacts, that take time to develop. High 
returns to venture capitalists provide incentives for potential entrants, but because of the high 
costs of entry and the time it takes to develop the necessary skills and contacts, it is unlikely that 
potential entrants can take advantage of market conditions in the short run. Because of this, it is 
not unexpected that during periods of increased fundraising by venture capitalists, I find that 
average portfolio size increases significantly. 
I then investigate the effects of a larger portfolio size on venture capitalist portfolio 
success rates in a univariate and multivariate framework. I conclude that portfolio size is an 
important explanatory variable when controlling for various fund level factors, including: fund 
age, fund size, and several portfolio company characteristics, including stage of development and 
industry. The empirical evidence presented in chapter 3 is consistent with the model developed 
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by Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003) that suggests the existence of a trade-off between venture 
capitalist portfolio size and the extent of managerial advice available to portfolio firms. 
The impact of distance and location on success rates in venture investing is examined in 
chapter 4. The nature of the subject matter in this chapter lends itself to analysis from the 
perspective of the portfolio companies’ success, rather than from the venture capitalists’ 
portfolio success rates. This is because of the way in which distance and location influence the 
investment relationship. Lerner (1995) demonstrates that venture capitalists tend to monitor their 
portfolio of investments less as the distance between them grows. This should have a negative 
impact on entrepreneurial firm success rates, all else equal. The empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis that distance matters in venture capital investing. 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992) examine the importance of network externalities in venture 
investing. The external benefits of operating a business in areas where venture capital is 
concentrated, such as Silicon Valley, California or Route 128 in Massachusetts, are difficult to 
quantify, but they are tangible nonetheless. Companies in the supply chain are more likely to be 
nearby, as are potential customers and support services. Network externalities should increase 
the likelihood of success for entrepreneurial firms, and consequently the role of location is likely 
to be an important determinant of success for firms receiving venture capital. This hypothesis is 
supported by the results of my analysis in chapter 4. This essay, as well as the last essay, relies 
upon related finance and banking theory due to the lack of theoretical work in the field of 
venture capital. 
The final essay in this dissertation deals with the choice of the degree of diversification in 
venture capitalist portfolios. In many ways the results of this final analysis are the most 
interesting because of the fact that the results support a strategy of diversification by stage of 
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development, while prior research by Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) suggests that venture 
capitalists prefer to specialize by both industry and stage of development of portfolio firms. My 
results are inconclusive regarding the decision to specialize or diversify across industries. 
The rationale for diversifying the venture capitalists’ portfolios is to eliminate, or at least 
minimize, unsystematic risk. Specialization, on the other hand, may give venture capitalists a 
comparative advantage in investing in a particular industry or stage of development. If the skill 
set, and network of contacts, is unique for different industries and stages of development, and if 
these skills and contacts are costly to acquire, then specialization should dominate. More 
directly, if specialization should dominate, then those venture capitalists that choose to diversify 
should achieve lower success rates, everything else equal. Contrary to expectations, I find that 
venture capitalists that diversify across portfolio company stage of development are more 
successful than those that specialize. The evidence suggests that the level of diversification 
across industry is irrelevant to portfolio success rates. 
There must be a rational explanation for venture capitalists to choose specialization over 
diversification, despite the lack of analytical evidence to support this strategy. The results may be 
influenced by the appearance of a diversified portfolio by some specialized funds in the sample. 
A venture fund may still hold shares in a firm as it moves beyond the early stages of 
development yet have little involvement in the activities of the firm. In other words, a fund could 
specialize in early stage ventures, maintain a lead role in the development of early stage firms 
until later rounds of investment, and then hand over the effective control of the firm to a venture 
fund specializing in later stage firms, while retaining shares of these firms. If the fund 
contributes any capital at these later stages, the investment round will be recorded in the SDC 
database as a later stage investment. Thus, an appearance of diversification across stages may be 
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due simply to the fact that the early stage venture investors hold shares and provide capital for 
the same portfolio firms at later stages of development in order to cash out at IPO or firm 
acquisition. I discuss other potential explanations for these results in chapter 5. 
In the next chapter I will describe the data used throughout this dissertation. I also discuss 
limitations of the SDC data in a broad sense, as well as in the specific case of the problems 
encountered in the writing of this manuscript. Although there are many issues that could be 
clarified if appropriate data were available, there are some interesting results in each of the 
following chapters. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 contain the three essays outlined above while a final 
chapter offers some concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: Dataset and Data Considerations 
 
 
 
 
A general concern about the SDC VentureXpert database is that all of the data is self-
reported by the venture capitalists themselves. This exposes any analysis of the data to inherent 
biasness, specifically selection bias. Venture capitalists may withhold information on funds that 
underperform, report inflated values for key variables, or somehow otherwise misrepresent their 
performance or descriptive statistics. Further complicating this problem, there is no apparent 
standardized system of providing data to the SDC. This concern is particularly relevant to the 
analysis in chapter 3 regarding venture capitalist portfolio size effects on success rates. The 
number of venture capitalists per fund is calculated based upon the number of executives 
reported by the funds to the SDC. Some funds appear to overstate this number by including 
employees with administrative titles, while others may understate this number by only reporting 
the general partners of the venture fund. 
This data is not subject to outside auditing because the funds are private partnerships. 
Thus, knowing that potential investors may purchase access to the database, venture capitalists 
have the incentive to withhold bad information while exaggerating good information. It seems 
likely that the effect of this bias should be minimal for my purposes because the SDC data does 
not include access to individual investment or fund-level performance data. While this data 
would be preferred for a study such as this, without it there is less concern about the potential
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 bias. As for the bias introduced by misreporting and lack of standardization, it is likely that these 
effects are minimized in a sample as large as the one studied here. Data from 1247 venture funds 
with a total of 25,027 investments form this dataset. 
The lack of individual investment return data is presumed to be a much bigger problem 
than the potential bias associated with self-reported data. Without this data, or at a minimum the 
fund-level returns data, it is difficult to say with certainty whether a venture investment was a 
success or a failure. Portfolio companies that go public are associated with high returns, as are 
those that are acquired to a lesser extent, but it is possible that some of the investments that exit 
by IPO or through acquisitions provide returns that would not be considered successful by 
anyone other than the entrepreneurs involved (who typically have a very limited capital 
investment). On the other hand, there are some cases where entrepreneurs buy out venture 
investors, resulting in positive returns for the venture funds but appearing to be a failure when 
reported to the SDC as a privately held firm. Lack of returns data also affects the interpretation 
of success for funds that primarily limit their investments to early stage portfolio companies. I 
control for this somewhat by including an indicator variable in my multivariate analyses, but this 
is unlikely to capture the entire effect. Venture capitalists that specialize in early stage ventures 
may have significantly lower success rates as defined herein, but the returns for each successful 
exit are greatly amplified the earlier the venture capitalists get involved in an investment. 
A successful exit is defined throughout the dissertation as a venture investment that has 
either been acquired or gone public through an initial public offering (IPO). I run all regressions 
using IPOs as the only defined successful exit as well. A commonly cited 1988 Venture 
Economics study entitled, Exiting Venture Capital Investments, finds that IPOs generate the 
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greatest returns to venture investors by a large margin, followed by acquisitions.1 As mentioned 
previously, fund level returns data would be a preferred measure of success, but the data is 
unavailable. Figure 1 demonstrates the success rates of the sample venture funds by year. 
Portfolio Success Rates by Year
1978 - 1997
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Figure 1 
Portfolio success rates over the twenty-year sample period.  Entrepreneurial firms in registration for an initial public 
offering are included as IPO firms. 
 
Because venture investments take time to develop, it is necessary to allow for a 
reasonable passage of time before writing off a poor investment. Venture capitalists typically 
will leave poor investments on the books until the fund dissolves, thus firms that are still 
privately held after several years have passed are considered failed investments. Following the 
work of Gompers and Lerner (1998a, 2000), I use a cut-off of five years, which leaves a sample 
period from 1978 to 1997. Approximately half of the venture investments in the VentureXpert 
database provide data regarding the year of investment resolution (success or failure). I calculate 
the difference between the fund year and year of exit for the sample investments. After dropping 
                                                          
1A $1 investment in a firm that goes public provides a 295% average return over an average of 4.2 years. The next 
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outliers and those with negative values, I find that the median time to IPO is 5 years. When I 
partition the data into the first 10 years versus the latter 10 years, I find that the mean over the 
last 10 years falls to 4, while the first 10 years has a median time to IPO of 7 years. This is 
consistent with popular press accounts of the fall in the time to IPO in the booming markets of 
the late 1990s. The data for all exits (successful or otherwise) follow a similar trend, with an 
overall median of 6 years, a median of 5 years for the latter 10-year period, and a 7-year median 
time to exit for the first 10 years of the sample period. This indicates that there is a bias 
introduced for the funds formed in the mid-90s. In order to control for the fact that some of the 
venture investments initiated in the mid-90s will be considered failed investments because they 
remain private firms as of July 2003, in unreported regressions, I include a dummy variable for 
those funds that were formed in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997. This variable is insignificant in all 
regressions, even if defined to include 1993 or drop 1994, while other variables remain 
significant. 
Much of the following analysis relies upon the fact that venture capitalists are active 
investors. Portfolio size is expected to be an important factor in explaining the success rates of 
venture capitalists because the ability to actively manage a portfolio of firms should fall as the 
number of investments rises. Similarly, distance is expected to play a significant role in the 
success of venture investments because time constraints dictate the extent of active portfolio 
management. Finally, the rationale for specialization over diversification is because large fixed 
costs of developing contacts and specialized skills should make it difficult for venture capitalists 
to actively manage firms in different industries or stages of development. All of these issues 
would ideally be studied using investment-level data. As a proxy for investment level data, I take 
averages across funds. While this does prove informative, there are issues that arise because of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
best payoff is 40% over 3.7 years, on average, to investments in acquired firms. 
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the lack of access to investment-level data, principal among them being the lack of knowledge 
about how the investments are distributed within each fund. 
A fund may consist of specialists in various industries, giving the appearance of a 
diversified portfolio when averaging across the fund. Likewise, one or two partners in a venture 
firm may be responsible for many investments as part of syndications where others take the lead 
(active) role in the management of the entrepreneurial firms. This would give the appearance of 
overinvestment by the venture fund even though it is not necessarily true. Without knowing 
exactly how each venture investment is structured, and how involved the venture capitalists are 
in those investments, it is difficult to isolate the impact of the variables of interest in this 
dissertation. Some of these problems are just due to a lack of information; others are due to a 
lack of details in the information reported to the SDC. 
Despite all of these limitations, the volume of data alone allows for a useful analysis. As 
mentioned above, there are 1247 funds reporting data over a twenty year time period in the final 
dataset. This data was culled from the SDC VentureXpert database in the summer of 2003. It 
represents only those venture capitalists that operate in the United States, that are organized as 
independent private partnerships, and that limited their investments to U.S. entrepreneurial 
firms.2 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the data by year. The data in Table 1 is presented 
                                                          
2 The data used in chapter 4 is further limited to only those venture capitalists in the continental United States, 
investing in continental U.S. entrepreneurial firms to avoid the distortion added by investments in Hawaii or Alaska. 
Chapter 5 data is reduced to 1099 funds when the dataset is limited to only those funds with at least 3 portfolio 
companies. 
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Fund Year
Number of 
Funds
Total Portfolio 
Companies
Fund Inflows   
$millions
Total 
Venture 
Capitalists
1978 14 623 $294.30 181
1979 11 313 227.20 167
1980 26 892 703.80 342
1981 45 1,453 1,135.40 436
1982 53 1,518 1,345.00 496
1983 76 1,900 2,027.50 686
1984 84 2,295 2,593.40 966
1985 57 1,428 1,684.90 634
1986 56 1,206 1,855.40 503
1987 73 1,527 2,807.70 817
1988 64 1,129 3,627.20 650
1989 75 1,206 2,679.10 840
1990 40 603 2,038.10 474
1991 33 404 1,235.30 348
1992 53 1,034 2,851.90 730
1993 65 977 3,295.60 711
1994 72 1,068 4,169.40 775
1995 105 1,444 6,525.90 1,184
1996 87 1,549 7,217.10 1,063
1997 158 2,458 14,756.80 1,922
Total 1247 25,027 63,071.00 13,925
Yearly 
Average 62.35 1251.35 3153.55 696.25
Table 1. Sample description by year (a)
The sample represents all U.S. venture funds, investing in U.S. firms, that are organized as
independent private partnerships, have non-missing data for the time period studied and are found
in the SDC VentureXpert Database in July 2003. Fund inflows are total commitments to venture
funds by investors, measured in millions of 1997 dollars. The total number of portfolio companies
for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the
fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund may have an
investment role in any portfolio firm. Total venture capitalists are proxied by the total number of
executives reported by the funds to SDC.
 
 
by year to illustrate the yearly fluctuations in some of the key variables of interest in chapter 3. 
The total number of portfolio companies receiving venture capital and the number of venture 
capitalists  in the  sample steadily rises  through  the  80s,  and then they  fall off  in 1990 – 1991, 
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Independent Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
PORTFOLIO SIZE 3.7 1.8 7.7
FUND SIZE 50.6 28.0 70.8
PORTFOLIO COMPANY 
AGE 1.0 1.0 3.8
FUND AGE 6.7 4.0 7.4
FUND NUMBER 3.2 2.0 3.4
HIGH-TECH % 59.4% 62.9% 0.30
HOT MARKET % 47.2% 44.4% 0.24
DISTANCE 850.2 348.7 982.5
EARLY STAGE % 37.7% 33.3% 0.34
MA OR CA % 50.9% 54.1% 0.30
Table 2. Summary statistics
The sample represents all U.S. venture funds, investing in U.S. firms, that are organized as independent private
partnerships, have non-missing data for the time period studied and are found in the SDC VentureXpert
Database in July 2003. PORTFOLIO SIZE is the number of portfolio companies per venture fund divided by the
number of executives per fund. FUND SIZE is the total commitments in millions of 1997 dollars. PORTFOLIO
COMPANY AGE is the number of years that the portfolio company was incorporated at the time of the venture
investment. FUND AGE is the number of years the venture capitalist firm was in operation at the time of the
fund formation. FUND NUMBER is the number of prior funds the venture firm had raised plus one. HIGH-
TECH % is the percentage of the funds' portfolio companies that are classified as information technology firms.
HOT MARKET % is the percentage of the funds' total IPOs that occurred in a hot market (a year is classified as
a hot market if there were more than 600 IPOs in that year). DISTANCE is the distance in miles between
venture capitalists and the entrepreneurial  firms  in  their  portfolios.  EARLY 
STAGE % is the percentage of the funds' portfolio companies that are early stage investments. MA OR CA
% is the percentage of the funds' portfolio companies that are located in Massachusetts or California.
 
before rising again over the next six years. The number of venture funds and yearly fund inflows 
follow a similar pattern, though there is more volatility in the 80s. Summary statistics for other 
variables of interest are provided in Table 2. 
 Venture capitalists in the sample oversee an average of 3.7 portfolio companies, and a 
typical venture fund invested in either California or Massachusetts, with a focus on high-tech 
firms. The average percent of the funds’ IPOs occurring during hot IPO markets is 47.2%, giving 
support to the perception that venture capitalists are able to time the markets since only one-
quarter of the years in the sample are identified as hot IPO market years. The median percentage 
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of the fund invested in early stage firms is 33.3%, suggesting that many of the funds in the 
sample have a significant number of investments in early stage ventures, though their stake in the 
early stage portfolio firms is more likely to be a small percentage of the total capital invested. 
 This illustrates the sometimes-deceptive nature of the data in the SDC database. Without 
more detailed data at the fund level or investment level, there will be some doubt about the 
significance of the ensuing analyses. As mentioned prior, the volume of data should allow for 
meaningful analysis. However, future research is warranted regarding each of the topics 
discussed herein, given the numerous concerns about the data currently available from the SDC. 
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Chapter 3: “Does Venture Capital Portfolio Size Matter?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The influence of portfolio size on venture capitalists’ success rates is 
examined in this manuscript. I demonstrate that venture capitalists exhibit a 
tendency to increase the number of portfolio investments following periods of 
growth in commitments from limited partners. Subsequently, I find that the 
increase in portfolio size is negatively related to venture capitalists’ rates of 
success across a sample of 1247 venture funds spanning a twenty-year time 
period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 There was extraordinary growth throughout the 90s in venture capital investments; from 
$4.3 billion in capital committed in 1990 to nearly $100 billion in 2000.3 This pattern in 
commitments corresponds with a general cycle of increased fund inflows from investors, 
following periods of high returns in the industry, which has developed over the past 25 years. 
These periods of increasing supply in capital are typically followed by a downturn in the cycle 
where returns plummet and subsequent investment is curtailed. A common theory says that the 
cycle is inevitable due to “too much capital chasing too few good projects” (Fenn, Liang and 
Prowse, 1997). As more low quality projects are funded, probability of failure increases, which 
leads to lower returns to a portfolio of venture capital investments. Naturally, investors scale 
back fund inflows as returns fall and fewer projects receive funding. Since fewer projects are 
funded, the quality of those projects is higher and eventually patient investors are rewarded with 
high returns (thus sparking the next wave of increased fundraising).4 
 While the cyclical nature of the venture capital industry is evident, understanding the 
underlying causes of the venture capital cycle is more difficult. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 
(2003) contribute to this understanding by suggesting that the supply of venture capitalists is 
relatively inelastic in the short run. In other words, the limiting factor behind the downturn in the 
cycle is not the lack of good projects, but a paucity of experienced venture capitalists. Anecdotal 
evidence supports this idea, which implies that the venture capital industry may be slower to 
                                                          
3 Source: Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) VentureXpert database. These figures are in constant 1997 dollars 
and represent commitments to U.S. venture capitalists organized as limited partnerships that invested in U.S. firms. 
4 Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2001) provide a detailed account of research relating to the venture capital industry. 
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completely adjust to shifts in either demand for or supply of venture investment dollars.5 If 
barriers to entry exist in the venture capital industry, then only two distinct outcomes are possible 
if fund commitments increase and these commitments are fully invested: venture capitalists 
increase the average amount of total financing in their portfolio companies, or they increase the 
total number of portfolio investments. 
 I speculate that over the past 20 years and in response to increases in capital flows, 
venture capitalists have increased both the total investment per portfolio firm, and the number of 
investments per venture portfolio. The focus of this manuscript is on the latter development. In 
this essay, I seek to establish whether the evidence supports this idea and if so, how venture 
capital portfolio success rates have been influenced. I suspect that an important consequence of 
investing in too many portfolio companies is that portfolio success rates will fall. This follows 
from the fact that venture capitalists do more than simply provide capital to high-risk, start-up 
firms. More importantly, they provide monitoring services, industry contacts, guidance in 
corporate strategy, and other support services for entrepreneurs. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 
(2002, 2003) hypothesize that a trade-off exists between the number of companies in a venture 
capitalist’s portfolio and the extent of the managerial advice that the venture capitalist is able to 
offer. The implications of such a tradeoff are that an optimal portfolio size exists, and deviations 
from the optimal should affect the success rates of the portfolio firms. The goal of this study is to 
empirically verify whether or not there is evidence of this trade-off, manifesting through 
decreased portfolio success rates. 
 Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2002, 2003) focus on the marginal costs and marginal 
benefits of increasing venture capitalists’ portfolio size. In their view, the marginal cost of 
                                                          
5 Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner have repeatedly referred to industry accounts of difficulty both in raising a limited 
partnership with no track record, and in grooming associates to become partners. See Gompers and Lerner (1996, 
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investing in too many portfolio companies can be measured in terms of ownership stake in the 
entrepreneurial firm, rather than necessarily an increase in the risk of failure of portfolio firms. 
As venture capitalists add firms to their portfolios, entrepreneurs rationally anticipate the level of 
managerial advice they are likely to receive from the venture capitalists and divide the shares of 
the firm accordingly.  In other words, the cost of overinvestment may be in lower returns per 
investment, rather than in lower likelihood of success per investment. It is likely that pricing and 
other contract terms adjust to market fluctuations in the venture industry; however, it is unlikely 
that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are able to fully adjust for the potential value lost in 
monitoring benefits. Regardless of the extent of pricing adjustments, if venture capitalist 
monitoring has positive value, then there should be a decreased likelihood of a portfolio 
company’s successful acquisition or initial public offering if the venture capitalist has 
overextended and invested in too many firms. 
 Alternatively, the data may support the idea that in the short run, the marginal cost of 
monitoring additional portfolio companies is low enough to allow for an increase in the size of 
venture capital portfolios with limited downside risk. The likelihood of failure may be less 
influenced by the ability of incumbent venture capitalists to effectively monitor portfolio firms, 
than by entry of less experienced venture capitalists that may choose to fund inferior projects. In 
other words, selecting the best projects to invest in may be more important to the success of a 
venture capitalist than the ability to provide proper oversight to the portfolio firms. 
 A related idea is that entrepreneurial firms require less managerial support during periods 
of high volume of initial public offerings (IPOs), or  “hot IPO” periods.6 Ritter (1991) labels 
these periods “windows of opportunity,” when it is easier to access public markets via IPOs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1999) for more. 
6 See Lowry and Schwert (2002) and Lowry (2003) for recent analyses of IPO cycles. 
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Venture backed firms tend to go public more quickly during these periods which typically 
coincide with rapid growth in the stock market indices. The most recent boom in the market had 
firms going public after only one-to-two years in a venture capital portfolio, as opposed to the 
three-to-five year historical norm. Since IPOs generate the greatest returns for venture capitalists 
(Gompers, 1995), it follows that these “windows of opportunity” also reflect periods of increased 
fundraising for venture capitalists.7 Easier access to public markets could counter the effects of 
investing in too many portfolio firms, at least in terms of the probability of successfully bringing 
entrepreneurial firms public. Lerner (1994) shows that seasoned venture capitalists are better 
able to take advantage of these “hot markets” to take portfolio companies public at market peaks. 
This is consistent with Gompers’ (1996) grandstanding hypothesis in which inexperienced 
venture capitalists may not wait to time IPOs optimally in order to establish a reputation for 
bringing entrepreneurial firms public. I will attempt to sort through these effects and establish 
whether or not portfolio size is relevant to venture capitalist success rates. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the venture capital industry and 
current related literature.  Section 3 describes the data and reviews the results of the empirical 
testing. A final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Venture Capital Industry 
 
 Prior research has established the unique role of venture capitalists in mitigating the 
asymmetric information problems of funding young, high-risk firms (Chan, 1983; Gorman and 
                                                          
7 Gompers (1995) cites a 1988 Venture Economics study which states that portfolio companies that eventually go 
public yield an average of 59.5% annual returns to venture capitalists. 
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Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; Black and Gilson, 1998).8 Typical bank financing is generally 
not available for those firms in an early stage of development (start-ups) that do not have 
tangible assets or positive cash flows.9 While venture capital financing is obviously important to 
young firms unable to secure bank loans, it is the monitoring and support provided by venture 
capitalists that distinguish them from other sources of financing. This support frequently includes 
helping to raise additional funds, forming company strategy, and management recruitment, 
among other functions (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Monitoring of portfolio firms commonly 
involves a seat on the board of directors and regular visits to the entrepreneurial firms, as well as 
facilitating customer and supplier relationships. 
 It takes time to develop the necessary skills for successful venture investing and thus, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that the supply of venture capitalists is inelastic in the short run.10 If 
this is true, then all else equal, during periods of increased venture capital fundraising, venture 
capitalists are likely to invest in more portfolio companies than they can effectively supervise.11 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) examine the impact of fund inflows on firm valuations. They show 
that although portfolio firm valuations are significantly influenced by capital inflows, increases 
in fundraising do not appear to affect the success rates of these firms. However, the analysis of 
success rates by Gompers and Lerner is limited in both scope and depth. Their data covers only 
five years of venture investments and the investigation into the effects of fund inflows on success 
                                                          
8 See Sahlman (1990) for a detailed analysis of the mechanisms used to control information asymmetries in venture 
capital organizations. 
9 Triantis (2001) suggests that the defining characteristic of venture capital contracts that allows VCs to fill the 
financing gap left by banks is the use of equity-linked convertible securities. Fixed interest payments of straight debt 
would be prohibitively high for these types of firms. The use of convertible preferred stock or debt allows for the 
substitution of a share of future gains in firm value for the interest payments of straight debt. 
10 Gompers and Lerner (1996) look at the short run effect of inelastic supply of venture capitalists on the total 
compensation they receive. Increased fundraising leads to less restrictive covenants (which provides an increase in 
private benefits accruing to the venture capitalists) or else a direct increase in monetary compensation in the form of 
higher fees or a greater percentage of the carried interest. Further, Gompers and Lerner (2000, p.295) state that 
venture capital organizations refrain from adding partners proportionally as capital under management grows. 
21 
 
rates is restricted to a single univariate comparison across time periods. Nevertheless, Gompers 
and Lerner conduct a thorough investigation into the effects of fund inflows on private equity 
valuations, and they show that periods of increased fundraising are followed by higher valuations 
at all stages of investment. As Lerner (2002) explains, the consequences of higher valuations 
include less monitoring control over portfolio firms through staged capital commitments and 
potentially less screening of potential investments through syndication. 
 In related research, Gompers and Lerner (1998a) document the importance of strategic fit 
in corporate venture capital investment success rates. Corporate venture capital funds are similar 
to independent partnerships in most ways besides organizational and compensation structure.12 
Gompers and Lerner (1998a) focus on the effectiveness of corporate venture investing relative to 
the more common, independent private partnerships. Their results document that corporate 
venture capitalists are at least as successful as their counterparts at independent organizations, 
particularly when the corporate venture investments exhibit some degree of complementarity 
between the corporation and the entrepreneurial firms. Santhanakrishnan (2003) studies the 
impact of complementarity on corporate venture success and further identifies the support 
provided by corporate venture capitalists as the mechanism through which complementarity 
influences the performance of portfolio firms. Consistent with the results of Gompers and Lerner 
(1998a), he finds that strategic fit between the entrepreneurial firms and corporate venture 
capitalists drives an overall increase in the likelihood of successful exits for investments by 
corporate venture capitalists (relative to those by independent venture capitalists.) 
 Thus far, Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2002) are the only researchers to address the 
relationship between success rates and portfolio size, but their paper is theoretical in nature. They 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 In order to fully invest the fund commitments, the venture capitalists must invest more per portfolio company, 
increase the size of their portfolio, or some combination of these two. 
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suggest that the number of firms in a venture capitalist’s portfolio should influence portfolio 
success rates, but focus their attention on a marginal cost versus marginal benefit analysis of 
changes in portfolio size. I seek to empirically test whether or not portfolio size is a significant 
determinant of successful venture investing. In a related paper, Cumming (2001) examines the 
determinants of portfolio size and finds that funds that raise more capital have larger portfolios. 
He does not investigate the relationship between portfolio size and success rates of portfolio 
firms; but he does provide support for the theory developed by Kanniainen and Keuschnigg 
(2002, 2003) that a trade-off exists between portfolio size and the extent of managerial advice 
per firm. Nevertheless the trade-off between the number of firms and managerial advice may 
only be important if there are significant consequences on the success rates of entrepreneurial 
firms because of the trade-off. 
 Alternatively, I may find that other factors dominate the cost of diminished guidance. If 
venture capitalists are adept at timing the expansion of their portfolios, then it may be possible to 
maintain prior success rates despite distributing less advice to each portfolio firm. I seek to fill 
this gap in the literature by empirically analyzing the changes in average portfolio size over a 
twenty year time period and how these changes affect the venture capitalists’ ability to 
successfully exit their investments.13 
 The determinants of venture capitalists’ portfolio success rates have not been explored in 
the literature. While Gompers and Lerner (1998a, 2000) and Santhanakrishnan (2003) have 
studied some of the influences of success from the entrepreneurial firms’ perspective, no prior 
research has focused on the factors that drive the success of venture investment portfolios. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
12 See Gompers and Lerner (1998a) or Hellman (2002) for a more detailed account of corporate venture investing. 
13 Typically a successful exit is one in which the company has been taken public via an IPO or else been acquired by 
another firm. This will be more formally defined in section 3 of this paper. 
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next section I will describe the data and empirically test for evidence that venture capitalists tend 
to overextend themselves when capital inflows increase. 
 
3. Data analysis 
 
 It is useful to first establish if there is any evidence that venture capitalists have a 
tendency to increase their average portfolio size during periods of increased fundraising. I will 
describe the data set before I proceed to the analysis. 
 
3.1. Sample description 
 
 A sample of 1247 U.S. venture capital funds, formed between January 1978 and 
December 1997, was drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) VentureXpert 
database.14 The sample was limited to independent private partnerships that raised funds 
specifically for investment in U.S. portfolio companies and it represents all funds maintained in 
the SDC database with non-missing data on fund size and other fund characteristics.15 Table 3 
provides descriptive statistics of the data by year. It is apparent that the key variables of interest 
in this essay exhibit a cyclical pattern with local peaks in the mid-80s and notable minimums in 
the early nineties. The mid- to late-90s had global maximums for the sample period for the 
number of funds, number of venture capitalists, portfolio companies and fund inflows.  
                                                          
14 The VentureXpert database has records as far back as 1962; however, data collection was not a primary focus 
before mid-1977 for Venture Economics (subsequently acquired by SDC). 
15 Private partnerships account for the vast majority of all venture capital raised over the time period of interest and 
have emerged as the dominant organizational form in the industry (approximately 80% of commitments in recent 
years.) 
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Fund Year
Number of 
Funds
Total Portfolio 
Companies
Fund Inflows   
$millions
Total 
Venture 
Capitalists
1978 14 623 $294.30 181
1979 11 313 227.20 167
1980 26 892 703.80 342
1981 45 1,453 1,135.40 436
1982 53 1,518 1,345.00 496
1983 76 1,900 2,027.50 686
1984 84 2,295 2,593.40 966
1985 57 1,428 1,684.90 634
1986 56 1,206 1,855.40 503
1987 73 1,527 2,807.70 817
1988 64 1,129 3,627.20 650
1989 75 1,206 2,679.10 840
1990 40 603 2,038.10 474
1991 33 404 1,235.30 348
1992 53 1,034 2,851.90 730
1993 65 977 3,295.60 711
1994 72 1,068 4,169.40 775
1995 105 1,444 6,525.90 1,184
1996 87 1,549 7,217.10 1,063
1997 158 2,458 14,756.80 1,922
Total 1247 25,027 63,071.00 13,925
Yearly 
Average 62.35 1251.35 3153.55 696.25
Table 3. Sample description, by year (b)
The sample represents all U.S. venture funds, investing in U.S. firms, that are organized as
independent private partnerships, have non-missing data for the time period studied and are found
in the SDC VentureXpert Database in July 2003. Fund inflows are total commitments to venture
funds by investors, measured in millions of 1997 dollars. The total number of portfolio companies
for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the
fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund may have an
investment role in any portfolio firm. Total venture capitalists are proxied by the total number of
executives reported by the funds to SDC.
 
 Following Gompers and Lerner (1998a, 2000) and Santhanakrishnan (2003), a venture 
capital investment is classified as a success if the portfolio company was acquired or if the 
company went public through an IPO (or was in registration for a public offering).16 Table 4 
                                                          
16 A 1988 Venture Economics study entitled Exiting Venture Capital Investments finds that a $1 investment in a firm 
that goes public provides a 295% average return over an average of 4.2 years. The next best payoff is 40% over 3.7 
years, on average, to investments in acquired firms. Gompers and Lerner (2000) include only those acquisitions at 
more than 2 times valuation as successful exits. SDC does not maintain the valuation data needed to make that 
distinction. 
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shows the distribution of investment outcomes across the twenty-year sample period. In most 
years, companies receiving venture capital were more likely to remain private than any other 
outcome. This is considered a failed investment and these companies are commonly referred to 
as “the living dead.”17 Venture capitalists’ portfolio success rates are calculated as the ratio of  
Fund 
Year
Total Portfolio 
Companies
Initial Public 
Offering 
Complete (or 
IPO filing) Acquired Still Private Defunct
1978 623 25.0% 35.2% 34.3% 5.3%
1979 313 25.2 38.0 30.0 6.4
1980 892 23.7 36.1 33.7 6.5
1981 1,453 21.8 34.0 36.8 7.1
1982 1,518 20.7 35.7 37.7 5.9
1983 1,900 26.0 31.3 36.5 6.5
1984 2,295 22.6 34.5 35.7 6.9
1985 1,428 25.5 26.4 43.7 4.6
1986 1,206 24.1 30.2 40.2 5.1
1987 1,527 25.1 27.7 43.2 3.6
1988 1,129 28.9 29.9 39.8 2.3
1989 1,206 27.3 29.7 38.9 4.1
1990 603 29.1 25.7 43.1 3.6
1991 404 33.3 27.4 36.9 4.9
1992 1,034 28.4 26.9 43.8 2.1
1993 977 24.9 26.4 45.4 4.2
1994 1,068 24.1 22.1 50.9 4.4
1995 1,444 21.4 20.8 54.8 5.9
1996 1,549 19.4 18.7 61.4 3.9
1997 2,458 16.8 17.2 62.2 5.9
Average 1,251 23.4 27.0 40.8 4.7
Std. Dev. 563 6.6 8.5 12.8 1.8
Table 4. Investment outcomes by year (a)
The table presents outcomes for the sample portfolio companies by year. The total number of portfolio
companies for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the
fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund may have an
investment role in any portfolio firm. Less than 0.5% of the total number of portfolio companies do not fall
into any of these categories due to name change, withdrawn IPO registration, or unknown status.
 
                                                          
17 From Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p. 237), “Much more common is the phenomenon know (sic) euphemistically 
among venture capitalists as ’the living dead,’ a phrase that refers to venture-backed companies that have failed to 
meet expectations but that nonetheless squeeze out a stable, independent existence.”  
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successful venture investments over the total number of portfolio firms. Though it is possible 
that these investments will ultimately be acquired or even go public, the most likely result will be 
that the investments will be written off for a loss at the termination of the venture capitalists’ 
partnership with the limited partners. 
 
3.2. Univariate results 
 
 The principal issue addressed in this essay is whether venture capitalists’ investment 
success rates are dependent on the number of entrepreneurial firms in the venture capitalists’ 
portfolios. More specifically, following periods of increased fundraising, do venture capitalists 
Figure 2 
Commitments are defined as the amount of money pledged to venture capital funds in a given year.  The data 
represents all commitments to venture capital funds raised by independent private partnerships in the U.S. that invest 
in U.S. firms reported to the SDC.  Returns data are yearly, pooled internal rates of return (IRR) based on cash flows 
from/to investors net of all management fees, partnership expenses, and the fund managers’ carried interest.  Returns 
for 2001 and 2002 are negative. 
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overextend themselves by investing in too many firms? I seek to answer this question by 
examining venture capitalists’ fund level data. It appears that periods of high returns are 
generally followed by periods of increased fundraising (see figure 2). The effects of increased 
fundraising on venture capitalists’ investment behavior are less clear, and the potential 
consequences of changes in the risk levels of venture investments have not been fully addressed. 
 An examination of venture capitalist investment behavior would ideally be carried out 
using portfolio level data. This data is only available to the venture capital firms themselves; that 
is, venture capitalists aggregate investment data across whole funds before reporting the 
information to the SDC. Fund level data is therefore averaged across the number of venture 
capitalists at each fund for the purposes of this analysis. 
 Before I look at the influence of portfolio size on venture capitalist success rates, I first 
attempt to establish the existence of two observable facts. First, that the supply of venture 
capitalists is relatively inelastic in the short run. Given the significant barriers to entry in the 
venture capital industry, due to the need for a substantial accumulation of a unique set of job 
skills and a network of business contacts, I expect to find that the short run supply of venture 
capitalists is relatively inelastic. Second, that venture capitalists tend to increase the size of their 
portfolios following periods of increased fund inflows. As fund inflows increase, venture 
capitalists can either invest more in each portfolio company or increase the size of their 
portfolios. I expect that both outcomes will be observed over the time period under investigation. 
 As a measure of the elasticity of supply of venture capitalists, I calculate the percentage 
change in quantity of venture capitalists raising funds from year-to-year divided by the 
percentage change in aggregate 1-year internal rate of return (IRR). Since (potential) venture 
capitalists themselves have limited information regarding individual fund performance, it is 
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reasonable to assume that positive growth in aggregate returns would provide incentive for 
potential venture capitalists to enter the industry.18 The average one-year elasticity of supply over 
the sample period is 0.84. This confirms the commonly asserted notion that the supply of venture 
capitalists is not elastic, at least in the short run. 
 The idea that the short run supply of venture capitalists is inelastic is assumed by 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2002, 2003), and has received no 
argument in the literature. Gompers and Lerner (2000) further assume that venture capitalists 
refrain from overextending themselves during periods of increased inflows. The authors show 
that for their sample there is a tendency to increase the valuations for the portfolio companies, 
though they do not consider the alternative outcome of increasing portfolio size. 
 While Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2002, 2003) focus on a marginal cost and marginal 
benefit analysis to establish a tradeoff between managerial advice and portfolio size, they also 
suggest that venture capitalists have a tendency to invest in too many portfolio companies 
following periods of increased fundraising. Panel A of Table 5 shows a comparison between 
average portfolio sizes in years with positive growth in fund commitments per venture capitalist 
versus years with negative growth in inflows. The mean number of investments per venture 
capitalist is 3.58 in those years that experienced a fall in fund commitments, while the average 
portfolio size is 4.95 when commitments increased. In other words, the average venture capitalist 
tends to invest in an average of 1.37 more entrepreneurial firms in years where more investment 
dollars are made available, compared to the prior year. Table 5 also reports the results of a 
univariate regression of portfolio size on average fund inflows per venture capitalist. The 
coefficient on my variable for fund inflows is positive and significant, providing further evidence 
                                                          
18 As opposed to potential venture capitalists lured into the industry by inside knowledge of particular fund returns. 
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Fund Inflows per 
VC
Number of 
Funds
Mean Portfolio 
Size
Standard 
Deviation
Positive Growth 534 4.95 8.19
Negative Growth 565 3.58 8.02
Z-stat, Mann-Whitney U Test for independence: -3.18  (0.001)
Coefficient t-stat
Intercept 3.35 15.03 (0.000)
Growth in 
Commitments 0.04 5.38 (0.000)
Table 5. Fund inflows' influence on average portfolio size
In Panel A, the sample is divided into funds created in years following positive growth
in commitments per venture capitalist and years following negative growth in
commitments per venture capitalist. Results of a Mann-Whitney U Test confirm that the
difference in means is significant. Panel B shows the results of a univariate regression
with average fund portfolio size as the dependent variable and average inflows per
venture capitalist as the independent variable. P-values are in parentheses.
Panel A:  Mean portfolio size in years with growth in investment dollars vs years with 
declining fund commitments
Panel B:  Portfolio size regressed on fund commitments per venture capitalist
 
that venture capitalists increase their portfolio size as investors increase the supply of investment 
dollars. In other words, there is a tendency for the average portfolio size to increase when the 
venture capital industry raises more capital. 
 Given that venture capitalists show a propensity to increase the size of their investment 
portfolio during periods of increased fundraising, I seek to establish how this trend affects the 
likelihood of success for the portfolio companies. Since success rates are defined across 
portfolios, my dependent variable is a ratio defined as the total number of successful investments 
divided by the total number of companies in a venture fund portfolio. Because the data are not 
normally distributed, I use nonparametric tests of correlation between success rates and portfolio 
size. 
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 Panel A of Table 6 reveals evidence of a tenuous relationship between venture capital 
portfolio size and success, though only for the definition of success that includes acquisitions. 
For the definition of success that includes acquisitions and IPOs, the correlation coefficient 
between success and portfolio size is 0.058, and it is significant at the 10% level. For IPOs only, 
there is no significant correlation. These correlation coefficients imply that a positive 
relationship exists between the number of portfolio companies per venture capitalist and the 
success  rates  of  venture  investments.  This  evidence  contradicts the theoretical  predictions of 
Success Rates    
(IPO or 
acquisition)
Success Rates    
(IPO only) Portfolio Size    
Success Rates    (IPO or 
acquisition) 1 (0.000) 0.67 (0.000) 0.058 (0.056)
Success Rates    (IPO only)
1 (0.000) -0.010 (0.743)
Portfolio Size       1 (0.000)
OLS Tobit
Success Rates    (IPO or 
acquisition)
  0.0009 
(0.267)
 0.0009              
(0.255)
Success Rates    (IPO only)  -0.0004 
(0.508)
 0.0001              
(0.983)
Panel B: Portfolio success regressed on portfolio size
Independent Variable: Portfolio Size
Table 6. Univariate analyses of fund success rates
Panel A: Correlations between portfolio success and size
Panel A shows a correlation matrix with two measures of success and two measures of portfolio size. Portfolio
success rates are: a) percentage of portfolio funds where a successful exit is defined as the portfolio company
going public through an IPO (or registration for an IPO) or acquistion of the portfolio company, and b)
percentage of portfolio funds where a successful exit is defined as the portfolio company going public through
an IPO (or registration for an IPO). Portfolio size is given by the number of portfolio firms in each fund divided
by the number of executives reported to the SDC. Correlation coefficients are Spearman's nonparametric
correlation estimates. Panel B reports the results of OLS and two-limit tobit regressions of success rates on
portfolio size. P-values are in parentheses.
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Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2002); however, the significant coefficient is small in absolute 
terms and there is no significant relationship between the IPO only measure of success and 
portfolio size. It may be the case that the relationship is significant because more successful 
venture capitalists are more likely to get good projects, and therefore may be in a better position 
to increase the size of their portfolio. This will be taken into account in my multivariate analysis. 
For further insight, univariate regressions are carried out using both ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and a two-limit tobit model specification. Panel B reports the results of both models, which 
demonstrate a lack of any significant relationship between portfolio size and portfolio success 
rates. 
 I suspect that the ambiguity of these results may be driven by the fact that many other 
factors could influence the success rates of venture capital portfolios. Venture capitalists may 
change their investment strategy during periods of growth in fund inflows, as well as increase the 
average number of investments.19 In the next section I will examine the effects of portfolio size 
on success rates in a multivariate framework in order to control for other factors that may 
influence venture capitalist success. 
 
3.3. Multivariate results 
 
 While Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that the portfolio firms’ probability of success 
may be independent of fund inflows, they suggest that venture capitalists change their investment 
approach during periods of increased fundraising. The authors show that portfolio companies 
have higher valuations during these periods, and the higher valuations are not due to changing 
                                                          
19 As Gompers and Lerner (2000) suggest; though they show empirically that there is no tendency to shift 
investments to later stage firms during periods of high inflows. We draw a similar conclusion from our sample.  
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company characteristics. According to their analysis, venture capitalists tend to increase the 
amount of capital committed to firms when faced with growth in investment dollars. They also 
find that firms receive more money at each round of investment. These changes in investment 
strategy should result in higher-risk portfolios and therefore, lower success rates. When firms 
receive more capital at each round, a key monitoring device may be stripped from the venture 
capitalist if portfolio firms require less total rounds because of this change. 
 Gompers (1996) suggests that the entry of young, less experienced venture capitalists 
leads to a rush to take portfolio companies public. This “grandstanding” hypothesis is supported 
by empirical evidence and is caused by a need to establish a positive reputation in order to raise 
new funds. Inexperienced venture capitalists cannot credibly signal their ability to investors 
unless they have a track record of successfully bringing firms to IPO. Gompers interprets the cost 
of bringing a firm to IPO early as either a smaller equity stake in the firm or greater underpricing 
at the IPO. Another potential cost lies in the success rates of the other portfolio companies in the 
venture capitalist’s fund. If bringing just one firm public early gives a new venture capitalist the 
ability to raise a follow-on fund, then it may be in the interest of the venture capitalist to focus 
his managerial advice on one or two of the best prospects in the portfolio.20 This implies that the 
venture capitalists’ overall portfolio success rates should fall, all else equal. Seasoned venture 
capitalists should have more success than those who are inexperienced, whether due to the 
grandstanding actions of inexperienced venture capitalists or improvements in human capital 
(development of network, better ability to conduct due diligence, etc.) over time. Age of the 
venture capitalists’ firm when the funds are raised, and fund sequence number (1 for the venture 
capitalists’ first fund, 2 for the second, etc.) will control for venture capitalists’ experience. 
                                                          
20 Gompers (1996, p. 137) provides anecdotal evidence that substantiates this possibility.  
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 Older portfolio companies should be more likely to succeed, particularly if they are in the 
later stage of development, as much of the uncertainty concerning future revenues ought to be 
resolved over time. Therefore, my model will consider the average number of years since 
incorporation for the portfolio of firms as a control variable. Reputation may be important for the 
success rates of the venture capitalists’ investments, if entrepreneurs with better projects seek out 
venture capitalists with better reputations. Gompers and Lerner (1998b) suggest that venture 
capitalists with good reputations are able to raise more total funds and larger funds. Total fund 
commitments will be used as a proxy for venture capitalist reputation. Industry effects may 
influence the results if some industries are known to have a higher risk/return profile. Portfolio 
companies are classified by the SDC into one of three general industries: information 
technology, non-high technology, or medical/health/life science.  The percentage of the portfolio 
that consists of information technology companies will be used to control for any possible 
industry effects. 
 Gompers and Lerner (2000) find evidence that portfolio companies located in 
Massachusetts and California are more likely to have increased valuations around periods of 
growth in inflows. A large percentage of venture investment takes place in these locations and an 
even greater percentage of venture funds are located in these two states. I expect that being 
located in MA or CA could increase portfolio success rates either because of network effects or 
because of the lower monitoring costs associated with investment in portfolio firms that are 
located in the same state as the venture capitalist. A dummy variable set equal to one if the 
venture fund is located in either of these two states, and zero otherwise, will control for this 
effect. 
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 I also control for the investment focus of the venture capitalists. Funds that focus on seed 
or early stage investment should have less success than those funds that invest in later stage or 
expansion stage firms. Seed and early stage portfolio companies may consist of little more than 
an idea or a prototype, while later stage and expansion stage companies typically are in 
production and theoretically much closer to a successful exit. A dummy variable is created that 
equals one if the fund focus is reported as either seed or early stage, and zero otherwise. Finally, 
if exit through IPO is easier during “hot markets”, increases in success rates may be due to the 
easy access to the public markets, rather than optimal portfolio size or any other factor. I use the 
ratio of IPOs that occurred in a hot market to total IPOs as a control for market conditions. For 
my purposes, a hot market is defined as a year in which more than 600 IPOs occurred.21 
 The multivariate analysis is conducted using a two-limit tobit model. Given the fact that 
my dependent variable is a ratio, and therefore bounded by zero and one, the tobit specification is 
appropriate. Table 7 presents the results of the multivariate regressions. Most of the explanatory 
variables are significant in all of the models, except for the coefficients on my fund seed or early 
stage focus indicator variable. In all specifications, the number of investments per venture 
capitalist has a statistically significant negative impact on the success rate of venture portfolios. 
Marginal effects demonstrate the economic significance of this effect. The marginal effects, 
calculated at the mean of all other independent variables, range from -.0014 to -.0023, depending 
on the specification. This can be interpreted to mean that for every entrepreneurial firm added to 
a venture capitalist’s portfolio, there is a decrease in the overall portfolio success rate of one- to 
two-thousandths of a percent. Though this sounds like a small figure, given the extraordinary 
sums of capital in the industry, as well as the reliance upon a small number of investments to 
                                                          
21 This is the top 25% of years in our sample. 
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carry the overall portfolio returns, it could mean the difference between a profitable investment 
and a losing portfolio. 
 When I define success as IPO or acquisition, my proxy for the reputation of the venture 
capitalists, fund size, is negative and significant. My other independent variables are as predicted  
Table 7. Multivariate analyses of fund success rates, portfolio size effects
Intercept
.531 
(0.000)
* .529 
(0.000)
* .247 
(0.000)
* .247 
(0.000)
*
Portfolio Size
 -.00224 
(0.008)
*  -.00240 
(0.013)
**  -.00179 
(0.032)
**  -.00185 
(0.027)
**
Fund Size
 -.000204 
(0.028)
**  -.000201 
(0.062)
***  .0000962 
(0.306)
 .000118 
(0.211)
Average Portfolio 
Company Age
.000264 
(0.000)
* .000480 
(0.000)
* .000712 
(0.031)
** .000709 
(0.040)
**
Fund Age
.00265 
(0.003)
* .00535 
(0.000)
*
Fund Number
.00479 
(0.035)
** .00948 
(0.000)
*
High-tech
.0309 
(0.162)
.0356 
(0.168)
 -.0707 
(0.002)
*  -.0657 
(0.004)
*
Hot Market
.000219 
(0.000)
* .000235 
(0.000)
* .000175 
(0.000)
* .000170 
(0.000)
*
Fund in CA or MA
.0581 
(0.000)
* .0680 
(0.000)
* .0667 
(0.000)
* .0664 
(0.000)
*
Seed or Early Stage 
Focus
 -.0121 
(0.345)
 -.0115 
(0.439)
.00846 
(0.518)
 .00924 
(0.482)
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
or CA and another dummy variable is set equal to one if the fund focused on seed or early stage investments. P-values
are in parentheses.
This table reports the results of two-limit tobit regressions with successful exits defined as IPOs (or registration for an
IPO) or acquisition or IPOs only. The dependent variable is the ratio of successful exits to total venture fund
investments. Portfolio size is the number of portfolio firms per venture fund divided by the number of executives
reported by the funds to SDC. Fund size is the total commitments in millions of 1997 dollars. Average portfolio
company age is the average difference between the year the fund was created and the year each portfolio company was 
founded. Fund age is the difference between the year the fund was created and the venture capitalists' firm founding
year. Fund number is the number of previous funds that the venture capital firm has raised previously plus one. High-
tech is the percentage of the portfolio companies that are information technology firms. Hot market is the ratio of hot
market IPOs to total IPOs (a year is classified as a hot market if there were more than 600 IPOs in that year). A
dummy variable is set equal to one if the fund is located in MA
IPO onlyIPO or Acquisition
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and significant, with the exception of the high-technology industry control variable. Portfolios 
that consist of older entrepreneurial firms are more likely to have higher success rates. My 
proxies for venture capitalist experience are positive and significant, implying that more 
experienced venture capitalists have higher success rates on average. My control variables for 
location and the effects of hot markets on success are significant and confirm my predictions. 
Funds that are located in Massachusetts or California are more likely to have higher success 
rates, as are funds that take advantage of IPO windows of opportunity. 
 The regression results are similar when the dependent variable is defined as success rates, 
considering only IPOs as a successful exit. Fund size is no longer significant and fund stage 
focus is still not a significant predictor of venture capitalists’ success rates, but now there are 
significant industry effects. This can be explained by the fact that early and seed stage firms are 
less likely than later stage firms to reach an IPO due to the level of uncertainty surrounding their 
future. Specifying a dummy variable for later stage investments may capture this effect, but there 
are too few early stage investments that IPO for this variable to explain much of the success or 
failure of venture capitalist funds. Industry effects may be significant in this specification 
because of the reliance of high-tech firms on thriving IPO markets for success. In other words, 
high-tech firms may be looked at by venture capitalists as an all-or-nothing type of investment. 
The nature of this relationship warrants further examination. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The number of entrepreneurial firms in the venture capitalists’ portfolios significantly 
affects portfolio success rates. This result is evident only when controlling for various other 
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influences on successful venture investing. The possibility that a trade-off exists as posited by 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003), that is, the entrepreneurs rationally anticipate that the 
venture capitalists will decrease their managerial influence and demand larger shares of their 
firms as compensation, is not necessarily ruled out by this analysis. However, I do find evidence 
that suggests that some optimal portfolio size exists. It would be useful to examine this issue 
using actual investment return data as well as individual investment contract information, rather 
than success rates based upon IPO or acquisition. Unfortunately, that data is fiercely protected by 
venture capitalists as recent news accounts report.22 
 This research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, I have presented evidence 
that venture capitalists have a tendency to increase their portfolio size in years following growth 
in fund inflows. This idea has received some attention in the literature, but has not been 
empirically tested. A further contribution is the examination of these changes in portfolio size on 
the success of venture investment portfolios. My results strongly suggest that portfolio size is an 
important determinant of venture capital portfolio success rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 As Daniel Gross reported for Slate magazine (September 17, 2003: http://slate.msn.com/id/2088544), several 
private equity funds are asking investors, including the University of California and the University of Michigan, to 
sell holdings rather than publicly divulge fund performance numbers. This issue arose in 2002 when the University 
of Texas Investment Management Company broke with tradition and published private equity returns. 
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Chapter 4: “An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Distance and Location in Venture Capital 
Financing” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 I examine the role of distance in venture capital investing. The majority of venture 
capital investment activity in the United States occurs in California and Massachusetts. 
However, growth in the industry over the past decade has led to an increase in activity 
outside of these areas. Alongside this development in venture investing outside of the 
traditional centers of activity, I find no tendency for the average distance between venture 
capitalists and portfolio companies to increase. I find evidence of network effects in 
California and Massachusetts and I also find that distance matters in venture investing. 
Firms that receive venture capital that are outside of California and Massachusetts, and 
firms that are farther away from the venture capitalists funding them, are less likely to 
achieve a successful exit. This result is robust even when controlling for other factors that 
influence the success of venture investments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Recent research by Peterson and Rajan (2002) has shown that distance between 
commercial banks and small business borrowers has become much less important due to 
improvements in information technology over time. They demonstrate a shift in the nature of 
small business lending from a focus on strict ex ante screening to less costly ex post monitoring. 
Firms in the venture capital industry provide capital to small businesses that are prohibitively 
risky for commercial banks. Venture capitalists do not typically have the benefit of prior 
relationships with entrepreneurs seeking venture capital as commercial banks may have with 
small businesses seeking loans, and they also tend to engage in a more active role in monitoring 
their investments. Because of this, it is less likely that technological improvements will allow for 
a similar shift from screening to monitoring in the venture capital industry. 
 Research in the venture capital field has emphasized the role of the venture capitalist in 
the ex post monitoring of their portfolio companies.23 The extent of the monitoring role has been 
shown to be dependent upon the distance between venture capitalists and their investments. 
Lerner (1995) analyzes the differences in the monitoring intensity of venture capitalists when the 
distance to portfolio companies increases. He finds that venture capitalists are more likely to be 
board members of their portfolio firms if they are closer to the portfolio company. Because 
monitoring costs are higher the further away the firms are located, this conclusion is intuitive. 
The impact of these disparities in the monitoring of portfolio firms has yet to be analyzed. 
Because the monitoring role of the venture capitalist is considered to be so crucial to the 
                                                          
23 See Gorman and Sahlman (1989) or Bygrave and Timmons (1992) for more on the role of venture capitalists in 
monitoring portfolio firms. 
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development of high-risk portfolio firms, my expectations are that portfolio firms that are further 
away from their nearest, associated venture firms will face a higher risk of failure. 
 This monitoring component of venture investing is the key difference between 
commercial bank lending and venture capital investing. Commercial banks have become more 
dependent on so-called, “hard” information in the monitoring of small business loans.24 Hard 
information has become less costly to obtain in recent years due to advances in information 
technology, allowing for the role of distance to diminish in importance for commercial banking 
over time. While improvements in technology have made it less costly for distant firms to 
receive commercial bank financing, I predict that distance still matters for successful venture 
capital financing. Hard information may be helpful to venture capitalists in their monitoring role, 
but the traditional role of a venture capitalist in the development of portfolio companies requires 
frequent contact with firm management, through phone calls or visits to the firms, and often 
sitting on the board of directors, among other responsibilities. The nature of venture capital 
investing precludes a similar shift in focus from screening to less costly monitoring by use of 
hard information. The ex post monitoring of portfolio companies relies on the gathering and 
processing of soft information, as well as actively steering entrepreneurs in the right direction 
when necessary. 
 Butler (2002) examines the importance of distance in investment banking and 
demonstrates that soft information is still important to the municipal bond underwriting industry. 
Unlike commercial banks, investment banks have been unable to take full advantage of the 
recent changes in information technology. There is little need for ex post monitoring in 
investment banking, and improvements in the production of hard information may have limited 
benefits to the ex ante screening process. Thus, Butler concludes that local underwriters hold an 
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advantage over non-local underwriters, especially when underwriting high-risk or non-rated 
bonds. He interprets this result to show that local investment banks are better able to assess soft 
information, allowing them to charge lower underwriting fees and sell bonds at better yields. 
 
1.1 Network externalities 
 
 Growth in venture capital investing in the 1990s was accompanied by some important 
changes in the industry, including the development of venture capital firms across the United 
States. In this essay I will look at the effects of the development of venture investing outside of 
the traditional centers of venture investment activity, Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 
in Massachusetts. To be sure, these areas still dominate the investment activity that is tracked by 
the Securities Data Corporation. California and Massachusetts firms receiving venture capital 
accounted for $2.2 billion of the $4.2 billion in venture investments in the fourth quarter of 2002. 
There appear to be network benefits to operating venture capital firms near one another. Bygrave 
(1988) demonstrates the importance of information sharing between venture capitalists to the 
reduction of uncertainty concerning investments. The principal means of reducing risk is through 
the syndication of investments among a network of venture capital firms. Syndication allows a 
greater number of venture capitalists to screen potential investments, thus reducing the likelihood 
of investing in a poor project. Bygrave and Timmons (1992) further examine the importance of 
other network externalities that apparently influence venture investing. Venture capitalists often 
provide entrepreneurs a list of industry contacts to facilitate the development of the portfolio 
firm. These contacts may include accountants, lawyers, suppliers, and customers, relationships 
that are critical to the success of an entrepreneurial firm. It is not unreasonable to assume that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
24 Peterson (2002) defines hard information as information that may easily be reduced to numbers. 
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there are external benefits to operating a venture capital firm in regions of the country that are 
known to contain many such firms. These benefits may come in the form of a greater selection of 
industry contacts to choose from, or simply contacts that are amicable to the venture capitalists 
due to the volume of business that takes place between them. I will examine the importance of 
these potential network externalities alongside my exploration of the importance of distance in 
venture investing. 
 I will proceed with a detailed look at the empirical data in order to determine trends over 
the past 20 years regarding the distance between venture capitalists and their portfolio 
companies. It is expected that growth in the 1990s encouraged entry into the venture capital 
industry, and along with entry I expect that I will find geographic expansion of the industry into 
states with little prior venture activity. It is possible that I will see some changes in the distance 
between venture capitalists and portfolio firms over this time period because of the lack of an 
established venture capital industry in these states. Since entrepreneurs are aware of the strength 
of the industry in these two states, as well as their relative strengths in different industries, 
venture capitalists that operate in California and Massachusetts are inundated with proposals for 
investment. 
 Venture capitalists operating outside of Massachusetts and California may be forced to 
consider firms that are further from their offices because of the lack of good investment projects 
in close proximity. On the other hand, venture capitalists looking to expand into other parts of 
the country may chose to operate from California or Massachusetts to take some advantage of 
network externalities, but finance portfolio companies outside the state. In either case, any 
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increase in distance between venture firms and entrepreneurs should have consequences since 
monitoring intensity has been shown to fall as this distance increases.25 
 
2. Data analysis 
 
 It is useful to first establish if there is any evidence that the distance between venture 
capitalists and their portfolio firms has changed over time. I can also determine whether there 
have been trends in venture investing outside of California and Massachusetts that run counter to 
these two crucial venture capital hubs. I will describe the data set before I proceed to the 
analysis. 
 
2.1 Sample description 
 
 A sample of 10,092 continental U.S. companies that received venture capital funding 
between January 1978 and December 1997, was drawn from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) VentureXpert database. The sample is limited to those portfolio companies that received 
venture capital from independent private partnerships in the U.S. and that report to the SDC.26 
Table 8 provides descriptive statistics of the sample by year. While there have been fluctuations 
from year-to-year, it is clear from the average distance statistic that there has been no tendency 
for the distance between venture capitalists and their investments either to increase or to decrease 
over the sample period. 
                                                          
25 Lerner (1995) finds that a venture investor with an office within 5 miles of a portfolio company has a 47 percent 
probability of serving on the board, while a venture capitalist whose nearest office is 500 miles away has a 22 
percent chance of serving as a director for that portfolio company. 
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Fund Year
Total 
Portfolio 
Companies
Average 
Distance
Total 
Portfolio 
Companies
Average 
Distance
% outside 
CA & MA
1978 613 956 245 942 0.40
1979 340 725 129 852 0.38
1980 1,103 889 365 1,003 0.33
1981 1,496 895 583 918 0.39
1982 1,603 901 629 779 0.39
1983 1,928 923 874 724 0.45
1984 2,351 918 1,072 777 0.46
1985 1,221 782 647 717 0.53
1986 1,163 754 590 551 0.51
1987 1,420 778 793 690 0.56
1988 1,085 832 533 822 0.49
1989 1,141 751 466 798 0.41
1990 514 920 261 674 0.51
1991 373 868 158 954 0.42
1992 899 935 363 896 0.40
1993 912 852 474 761 0.52
1994 959 692 468 756 0.49
1995 1,384 892 548 946 0.40
1996 1,409 882 630 873 0.45
1997 2,384 786 1,172 789 0.49
Average 1,215 847 550 811 0.45
Std. Dev. 568 78 276 113 0.06
Table 8. Sample description by year (c) 
All States All States but CA or MA
The sample represents all continental U.S. firms receiving venture capital from U.S. venture funds, organized as
independent private partnerships, that have non-missing data for the time period studied and are found in the SDC
VentureXpert Database as of July 2003. The total number of portfolio companies for any given year overstates the 
total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the fact that many venture investments are syndicated
and therefore, more than one fund may have an investment role in any portfolio firm and many firms receive
multiple rounds of venture funding. Average Distance is the yearly average distance in miles between venture
capitalists and their investments (portfolio companies). All states includes all continental U.S. states while All
States but CA or MA drops the portfolio companies from these two states from the sample. The final column
gives the percentage of venture activity that lies outside of CA and MA for each year.
 
 I speculate that more recent growth in venture activity has occurred outside of California 
and Massachusetts and if true, that I should find a difference in average distance between these 
portfolio companies and their respective venture firms. This is in fact not supported by the data. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 Private partnerships account for the vast majority of all venture capital raised over the time period of interest and 
have emerged as the dominant organizational form in the industry (approximately 80% of commitments in recent 
years according to Gompers (1998)). 
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There has been no tendency for venture activity outside of California and Massachusetts to 
increase at a faster rate than within these two states over the sample period. The average distance 
between portfolio firms and venture capitalists also appears to be unrelated to whether or not the 
portfolio firm is operating in either of these two states. 
 
2.2 Univariate analysis 
 
 Ideally I would examine the actual returns from each investment in order to determine the 
relative success across my sample. This data is not publicly available, so I use the eventual 
outcome of the investments as a proxy. Following Gompers and Lerner (1998a, 2000) and 
Santhanakrishnan (2002), a venture capital investment is classified as a success if the portfolio 
company was acquired or if the company went public through an IPO (or was in registration for 
a public offering).27 Table 9 shows the distribution of investment outcomes across the twenty-
year sample period. In most years, companies receiving venture capital were more likely to 
remain private than any other outcome. This is considered a failed investment and these 
companies are commonly referred to as “the living dead.”28 While these firms may be successful 
from the viewpoint of the entrepreneurs involved, it is unlikely that the venture capitalists will 
earn any significant profit from the majority of this type of deal. 
 I first organize the dataset into pairs of venture capital funds and portfolio firms. I then 
focus my analysis  on  the  pair  with  the shortest  distance between  offices.  The closest venture 
                                                          
27 Gompers and Lerner (1999, p.23) cite a 1988 Venture Economics study entitled Exiting Venture Capital 
Investments that finds that a $1 investment in a firm that goes public provides a 295% average return over an 
average of 4.2 years. The next best payoff is 40% over 3.7 years, on average, to investments in acquired firms. 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) include only those acquisitions at more than 2 times valuation as successful exits. SDC 
does not maintain the valuation data needed to make that distinction. 
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Fund 
Year
Total Portfolio 
Companies
Initial Public 
Offering 
Complete (or 
IPO filing) Acquired Still Private Defunct
1978 623 25.0% 35.2% 34.3% 5.3%
1979 313 25.2 38.0 30.0 6.4
1980 892 23.7 36.1 33.7 6.5
1981 1,453 21.8 34.0 36.8 7.1
1982 1,518 20.7 35.7 37.7 5.9
1983 1,900 26.0 31.3 36.5 6.5
1984 2,295 22.6 34.5 35.7 6.9
1985 1,428 25.5 26.4 43.7 4.6
1986 1,206 24.1 30.2 40.2 5.1
1987 1,527 25.1 27.7 43.2 3.6
1988 1,129 28.9 29.9 39.8 2.3
1989 1,206 27.3 29.7 38.9 4.1
1990 603 29.1 25.7 43.1 3.6
1991 404 33.3 27.4 36.9 4.9
1992 1,034 28.4 26.9 43.8 2.1
1993 977 24.9 26.4 45.4 4.2
1994 1,068 24.1 22.1 50.9 4.4
1995 1,444 21.4 20.8 54.8 5.9
1996 1,549 19.4 18.7 61.4 3.9
1997 2,458 16.8 17.2 62.2 5.9
Average 1,251 23.4 27.0 40.8 4.7
Std. Dev. 563 6.6 8.5 12.8 1.8
Table 9. Investment outcomes by year (b)
The table presents outcomes for the sample portfolio companies by year. The total number of portfolio
companies for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the
fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund may have an
investment role in any portfolio firm. Less than 0.5% of the total number of portfolio companies do not fall
into any of these categories due to name change, withdrawn IPO registration, or unknown status.
 
capitalist is most likely to take the more active role in portfolio company development. I then 
take two separate approaches to see if distance affects the success rates of my sample portfolio 
companies. 
 First, the venture capitalist-portfolio firm pairs are classified as local if there is at least 
one venture investor that is in the same state as the portfolio firm. About half of the sample firms 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
28 From Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p. 237), “Much more common is the phenomenon know (sic) euphemistically 
among venture capitalists as ’the living dead,’ a phrase that refers to venture-backed companies that have failed to 
meet expectations but that nonetheless squeeze out a stable, independent existence.”  
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have received venture capital from more than one fund. If the portfolio firms only receive 
venture funds from out-of-state venture capitalists, the relationship is considered non-local. 
Average success rates for pairs of entrepreneurial firms and venture investors that are local will 
be compared with those of non-local pairs. This approach follows that of Butler (2002) and 
suffers from the fact that a great deal of venture activity may occur within a large state, classified 
as local, and yet the venture capitalists could be hundreds of miles away from the portfolio firms. 
This approach has more resonance in the context of Butler’s examination of distance in an 
investment banking setting because of the focus on the importance of soft information, local 
knowledge of state banking regulation, and potential political influence in underwriting public 
bond issues. 
 In the second approach I group the portfolio company-venture capitalist pairs into 
quartiles by actual distance29. The top quartile represents those portfolio companies that are 
within 12.90 miles of the nearest venture investor, while the bottom quartile encompasses pairs 
that are greater than 787 miles apart. This approach deals more directly with the question I am 
trying to answer as I speculate that venture investors are less likely to fully participate in the 
active monitoring of portfolio firms as the distance between them and their investments 
increases. 
 Table 10, Panel A shows that there is some evidence that the longer the distance between 
a portfolio company and it’s closest venture capital investor, the less likely the portfolio 
company will be successful. While there is no difference between the likelihood of an IPO for 
the sample firms, portfolio companies in my sample were more likely to be acquired when at 
least one venture capitalist was located in the same state. The success rate for in-state pairs is 
                                                          
29 A software program, called ZIPFind® Deluxe 5.0, was used to calculate the distance between postal codes of the 
portfolio company-venture capitalist pairs. 
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.024 higher than that of out-of-state pairs, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.    
Panel B shows the results when looking at actual distance. 
Panel A: In-state versus Out-of-state PC-VC pairs
In-state Out-of-state
Number of Pairs 5221 4871
Success Rates (IPO only) 0.1712 0.1790
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: -1.029 (.304)
Success Rates (IPO or 
Acquisition) 0.4403 0.4163
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: 2.434 (.015)**
Panel B: PC-VC pairs by distance quartile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Number of Pairs 2540 2506 2523 2523
Success Rates (IPO only) 0.1854 0.1692 0.1645 0.1807
.432 (.666)
Success Rates (IPO or 
Acquisition) 0.4504 0.4461 0.4162 0.4023
3.463 (.001)***
t-test , Difference in Success Rates between 1st and 4th quartile:
t-test , Difference in Success Rates between 1st and 4th quartile:
Table 10. Univariate analysis distance effects
The table presents success rates for sample portfolio companies. Panel A shows the difference in the 
success rates for portfolio companies that have at least one in-state venture investor compared with 
the success rates for portfolio companies that do not have a single in-state venture investor. Panel B 
shows the difference in the success rates for portfolio company (PC) - venture capitalist (VC) pairs 
grouped by distance quartile. The first quartile consists of PC-VC pairs below 12.90 miles apart, the 
second quartile 12.90 - 110.91, the third 110.92 - 787.66, and the last quartile are pairs separated by 
more than 787.66 miles. P-Values are in parentheses.
 
 The difference between the success rates of the top quartile versus the lowest quartile is 
once again insignificant for IPOs only, but significant for the measure of success that includes 
acquisitions. Firms receiving venture capital that are relatively close to the nearest venture 
investor are more likely to successfully IPO or be acquired than those that are relatively far away 
from the nearest venture investor. The firms in the top quartile were successful 45% of the time, 
as opposed to the firms in the bottom quartile success rate of 40%. 
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 Since I am looking for evidence of network effects in the venture industry, I further 
classify the portfolio companies in my sample by state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
My ex ante conjecture is that success rates for entrepreneurial firms in Massachusetts and 
California will be higher than the average across all other states. This effect should be even more 
dramatic in a comparison between firms located in the Boston, San Jose, or San Francisco 
metropolitan regions, and those in all other areas of the country. These are the top three 
metropolitan regions in both total venture deals and total dollars invested, and are the traditional 
centers of venture investing in the United States. 
Panel A: California and Massachusetts versus all other states
CA or MA All other states
Number of PCs 4725 5367
Success Rates (IPO only) 0.1835 0.1675
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: -2.109 (.035)**
Success Rates (IPO or 
Acquisition) 0.4601 0.4012
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: -5.981 (.000)***
Panel B: Boston, San Jose and San Francisco versus all other MSAs
Top 3 MSA All other MSAs
Number of PCs 2995 7097
Success Rates (IPO only) 0.1866 0.1701
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: -2.002 (.045)**
Success Rates (IPO or 
Acquisition) 0.4604 0.4154
t-test , Difference in Success Rates: -4.181 (.000)***
Table 11. Univariate analysis network effects
The table presents success rates for sample portfolio companies. Panel A shows the difference in the 
success rates for portfolio companies that are located in California or Massachusetts versus those 
outside of these two states. Panel B shows the difference in the success rates for portfolio companies 
located in the top three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) for venture investment dollars, Boston, 
San Jose and San Francisco versus portfolio companies outside of these areas. P-Values are in 
parentheses.
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 Table 11 presents the results of these univariate analyses. Regardless of the measure of 
success, the data supports the theory that the long-established centers of venture activity in 
California and Massachusetts are more conducive to successful venture investing. Panel A shows 
that the rate of successful exit via IPO for firms receiving venture capital in Massachusetts and 
California is 18.4% versus 16.8% for portfolio companies in all other states. A t-test shows that 
the difference is significant at the 5% level. When considering acquisitions as successful exits, 
the effects are even more impressive: 46.0% versus 40.1%, significant at the 1% level. Similar 
results are reported in Panel B, which breaks down the portfolio companies by MSA. 
Entrepreneurial firms located in the Boston, San Jose, or San Francisco metropolitan regions are 
more likely to successfully IPO or be acquired. 
 Because there are likely many determinants of success in venture investing, I suspect that 
other factors may be driving the results of my univariate analysis. In the subsequent section, I 
will examine the effects of both distance and network effects on success in a multivariate 
framework in order to control for other factors that may influence the chances of a successful 
exit for portfolio companies receiving venture capital. 
 
2.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
 Gompers and Lerner (2000) analyze success rates of firms receiving venture capital 
during periods of increased commitments and find that the portfolio firms’ probability of success 
are independent of fund inflows. While they do not examine success rates in a multivariate 
framework, they do explore potential factors that may influence the valuation of venture 
investments. Gompers and Lerner (2000) examine the impact of fund inflows on venture capital 
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valuations. They are able to show that portfolio companies have higher valuations during periods 
of increased inflows, and the higher valuations are not due to changing company characteristics. 
According to their analysis, venture capitalists tend to increase the amount of capital committed 
to firms when faced with growth in investment dollars. Several of the factors used in their 
analysis will be used to control for any effects that they may have on portfolio company success 
rates. Other factors are based upon prior literature. 
 Gompers (1996) suggests that the entry of young, less experienced venture capitalists 
leads to a rush to take portfolio companies public. This “grandstanding” hypothesis is supported 
by empirical evidence and is caused by a need to establish a positive reputation in order to raise 
new funds.  Inexperienced venture capitalists cannot credibly signal their ability to investors 
unless they have a track record of successfully bringing firms to IPO. Gompers interprets the cost 
of bringing a firm to IPO early as either a smaller equity stake in the firm or greater underpricing 
at the IPO. Another potential cost lies in the success rates of the other portfolio companies in the 
venture capitalist’s fund. If bringing just one firm public early gives a new venture capitalist the 
ability to raise a follow-on fund, then it may be in the interest of the venture capitalist to focus 
his/her managerial advice on one or two of the best prospects in the portfolio.30 This implies that 
the other firms in a venture portfolio should have less likelihood of success, all else equal. 
Regardless, seasoned venture capitalists should have more success than those who are 
inexperienced, whether due to the grandstanding actions of inexperienced venture capitalists or 
improvements in human capital over time. I use the average age of the venture capital firms 
investing in each portfolio company as a control for venture capitalists’ experience.31 
                                                          
30 Gompers (1996, p. 137) provides anecdotal evidence that substantiates this possibility.  
31 In cases where the SDC data is inconsistent, the fund age is set to zero. 
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 Older portfolio companies should be more likely to succeed, particularly if they are later 
stage firms, as much of the uncertainty concerning future revenues ought to be resolved over 
time. Therefore, my model will consider the number of years since incorporation for the portfolio 
firms as a control variable for company age.32 Reputation may be important for the success rates 
of the venture capitalists’ investments, if entrepreneurs with better projects seek out venture 
capitalists with better reputations. Gompers and Lerner (1998b) suggest that venture capitalists 
with good reputations are able to raise more funds and larger funds. Total fund commitments will 
be used as a proxy for venture capitalist reputation. Industry effects may influence the results if 
some industries are known to have a higher risk/return profile. Portfolio companies are classified 
by the SDC into one of three general industries: information technology, non-high technology, or 
medical/health/life science.  A dummy variable that is set equal to one if the company is in an 
information technology industry, and zero otherwise, will control for industry effects. 
 Finally, if exit through IPO is easier during “hot markets”, increases in success rates may 
be due to the easy access to the public markets, rather than distance or any other factor. I use a 
dummy variable that equals one if the firm conducted an IPO in a hot market, and zero 
otherwise. For my purposes, a hot market is defined as a year in which more than 600 IPOs 
occurred.33 
 The multivariate analysis is conducted using logit regression. The dependent variable is 
set equal to one if the portfolio company was acquired or went public through an IPO.34 The 
model to be tested is: 
 
                                                          
32 The sample size drops from 10,092 portfolio companies to 8,273 in models including portfolio company age due 
to limited data availability. 
33 This is the top 25% of years in our sample. 
34 We also run all regressions with IPO only as the definition of success. 
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 SUCCESS =  
0 1 2 3
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7
/ _ _
_ _ _
_ / 3 _
LOCAL DISTANCE FUND SIZE CO AGE
FUND AGE HIGH TECH HOT MARKET
CA MA TOP MSA
β β β β
β β β
β ε
+ + +
+ + +
+ +
  
 
where, 
 
SUCCESS  is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company was 
acquired or went public through an IPO, and zero otherwise; 
LOCAL  is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company 
received capital from at least one venture fund located in the same 
state, and zero otherwise; 
DISTANCE is the distance in miles between the portfolio company and the 
nearest venture investor; 
FUND_SIZE is the average amount of money raised by the venture funds 
investing in the portfolio company; 
CO_AGE is the age of the portfolio company at the time of its initial 
investment; 
FUND_AGE is the average age of the venture funds investing in the portfolio 
company; 
HIGH_TECH is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company is an 
information technology firm, and zero otherwise; 
HOT_MARKET is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company 
IPO’d during a hot market, and zero otherwise; 
CA_MA is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company is 
located in California or Massachusetts, and zero otherwise; 
TOP3_MSA is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company is 
located in Boston, San Jose, or San Francisco. 
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 Table 12 contains the results of my multivariate analysis. Regarding the impact of 
distance  on   portfolio  company  success,   the  multivariate  results  mirror  my  findings  in  the  
Intercept -1.099        
(.0000)*
-.964     
(.0000)*
-1.141    
(.0000)*
-1.000      
(.0000)*
-.940 
(.0000)*
Distance -.0000747  
(.0041)*
-.0000669  
(.0199)**
-.0000628 
(.0296)**
Same state .311       
(.5050)
.0716       
(.1467)
Portfolio company 
age
.0154    
(.0000)*
.0149      
(.0000)*
.0149  
(.0000)*
Average fund age -.00405      
(.1100)
-.00687  
(.0168)**
-.00443  
(.0804)***
-.00708    
(.0136)**
-.00690 
(.0162)**
Average fund size .131     
(.0000)*
.124    
(.0000)*
.129     
(.0000)*
.129       
(.0000)*
.131  
(.0000)*
High-tech .226         
(.0000)*
.196     
(.0000)*
.227       
(.0000)*
.205      
(.0000)*
.208   
(.0000)*
Hot market 3.023     
(.0000)*
2.876   
(.0000)*
3.024    
(.0000)*
2.881      
(.0000)*
2.881 
(.0000)*
Fund in top 3 MSA .116        
(.0306)**
.128   
(.0123)**
Fund in CA or MA .176    
(.0000)*
.204     
(.0000)*
.168         
(.0004)*
Table 12. Multivariate analyses of portfolio company success rates [IPO or Acquisition]
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
This table reports the results of logit regressions with successful exits defined as IPOs (or registration for an IPO)
or Acquisitons. Distance is the distance in miles between portfolio companies and the nearest venture investor.
Same-state is a dummy variable equal to one if the portfolio company is located in the same state as at least one
venture investor. Fund size is the log of the average total fund commitments in millions of 1997 dollars for each
fund invested in the portfolio company. Portfolio company age is the difference between the year the portfolio
company received initial venture funding and the year of incorporation (or zero if negative.) Average fund age is
the average difference between the year each fund was created and the venture capitalist firms' founding year.
High-tech is a dummy variable set equal to one if the portfolio company is an information technology firm. Hot
market is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the portfolio company IPO'd in a hot market year (a year is classified as
a hot market if there were more than 600 IPOs in that year). A dummy variable is set equal to one if the
entrepreneurial firm is located in Massachusetts or California and 
zero otherwise. Top3 MSA is a dummy variable set equal to onefor the top three venture capital Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs), and zero otherwise. P-values are in parentheses.
Independent variable: Portfolio Company Success
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preceding univariate analysis. Distance is not a significant determinant of portfolio company 
success when limiting the definition of success to IPO only. However, when acquisitions are 
considered to be successful venture investments along with IPOs, distance is significantly related 
to entrepreneurial firm success. Entrepreneurial companies that are farther away from their 
nearest venture investors are less likely to succeed via IPO or acquisition. 
 These results are only significant when considering the actual distance between venture 
capitalists and portfolio firms. Using the local versus non-local approach of Butler (2003) gives 
no conclusive evidence that distance is an important factor in venture investing. This is not 
surprising given the concentration of venture activity in California and, to a lesser extent, Texas, 
where firms may be hundreds of miles away from their nearest venture investor yet be 
considered local if they are in the same state. 
 All of my other independent variables are significant and match my predictions with the 
exception of average fund age. This variable was predicted to be positive as a proxy for venture 
capitalist experience. One would reasonably expect that more experienced venture investors 
would drive higher success rates in portfolio firms. In one specification this variable is negative 
and insignificant, while in the others it is negative and significant. This may be due to the fact 
that many venture investments are syndicated and it is possible that taking the average fund age 
distorts the influence of venture experience on portfolio company success. Also, data in the 
VentureXpert database is often inconsistent or illogical. In this case, venture capitalists’ fund age 
is biased downward because where the SDC data was inconsistent I set the fund age to zero 
rather than dropping the data. Despite problems with fund age as a predictor of portfolio 
company success, the other predictors are consistent with my ex ante expectations. 
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 Portfolio company age is positive and significant, as is the average fund size. Whether or 
not average fund size is a reasonable proxy for venture capitalist reputation, it is highly 
significant in my regressions and captures some effect on venture portfolio company success. My 
indicator variables for both high technology firms and hot market years are also positive and 
highly significant. Controlling for these industry effects and market fluctuations enables me to 
take in a much clearer picture of how distance influences success. 
 The significance of my last two variables of interest substantiates the evidence of 
network effects found in the previous section. Considering the Boston, San Jose and San 
Francisco MSAs, or just the states of California and Massachusetts, firms receiving venture 
capital in these areas are more likely to be successful venture investments. These areas of the 
country lead the United States in venture activity year after year because there are positive 
network externalities present that influence the success rates for entrepreneurial firms.35 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
 I set out to examine the role of distance in venture capital investing. I have found 
evidence that supports my predictions that distance is a significant determinant of venture capital 
portfolio company success. I did not find any evidence that distance between venture capitalists 
and their portfolio firms has changed over the time period under study, nor did I find evidence 
that a greater percentage of investment was taking place outside of the two major hubs of venture 
activity, California and Massachusetts. The development of the venture capital industry outside 
of these two states is an interesting topic for future research. Is it possible to replicate the success 
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of the venture markets in California and Massachusetts, and what areas of the country would 
make the ideal candidate for such a leap in both volume and success? Venture activity in these 
two states has been shown to be more likely to result in a successful IPO or acquisition for the 
entrepreneurial firm, so there are incentives for entrepreneurs to seek venture funding in these 
states first. 
 As a corollary to my findings on the importance of distance and location for venture 
investing, I have confirmed that at least several other factors have some ability to influence 
venture success rates. While these factors have been introduced as potential indicators of venture 
portfolio firm valuations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000), very little work has been done looking at 
the determinants of success in venture investing. I propose that the factors discussed in this paper 
are a good start for future research of this question. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
35 This is consistent with the findings of Florida and Smith (1993), who determine that capital mobility occurs, but it 
is not due to unimpeded capital markets, rather through the network structure of the venture capital industry. Their 
focus is on the geographic effects of the venture industry. 
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Chapter 5: ”Specialization versus Diversification in Venture Capital Investing” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 I examine the benefits of a strategy of specialization versus diversification in 
venture capital investing. While modern portfolio theory demonstrates that a well-
diversified portfolio will eliminate unsystematic risk, it may be impractical to achieve a 
well-diversified portfolio of venture capital investments due to market imperfections. 
Given the high risk-return profile, and the disproportionate information costs associated 
with venture investments, a strategy of specialization has come to dominate the industry. 
An analysis of venture capitalists’ portfolio success rates suggests that this strategy may 
be flawed. I find that venture capitalists that diversify across portfolio company stage of 
development have greater success in bringing companies public and exiting their 
investments via acquisition. Diversification across industry appears to have no impact on 
venture fund success rates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Modern portfolio theory demonstrates that diversification across a portfolio of 
investments is an optimal approach to minimize unsystematic, or firm-specific, risk. In venture 
capital investing however, an alternative strategy of specialization in specific industries and stage 
of development of portfolio firms has been shown to dominate. Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) 
examine survey responses of 98 venture capitalists and show that venture capitalists involved in 
seed round financing are less diversified across firms and industries, and that venture capitalists 
are more likely to specialize in specific stages of development rather than diversify. Gupta and 
Sapienza (1992) find a similar tendency for early-stage venture firms to specialize in industry 
and geographic scope. Their findings are consistent with Bygrave (1987) and Sahlman (1990) 
who emphasize the importance of specialized information gathering and information sharing in 
the venture capital industry, as well as the development of networks of relationships. These 
networks allow venture capitalists to reduce investment uncertainty through syndication and are 
integral to the success of venture investments. 
 Specialization in venture investing has benefits in both the ex ante screening of potential 
investments, as well as in the ex post monitoring of portfolio firms. Specialized industry 
knowledge is costly to accumulate and the development of this knowledge may provide the 
venture capitalist with a competitive advantage over those who pursue a strategy of 
diversification. Perhaps more importantly, a venture capitalist that focuses on a particular 
industry is more likely to develop strong relationships within the industry that may facilitate the 
development of portfolio firms. These relationships may be beneficial because of the unique 
emphasis on active portfolio management found in venture capital investing. Venture capitalists 
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provide entrepreneurs with industry contacts such as accountants, patent lawyers, marketing 
consultants and suppliers, that aid in the growth of the firm. Venture capitalists may even get 
involved in operations-level decision-making of the firms in their portfolio, if warranted.36 All of 
these activities require some level of human capital that is costly to acquire. I suggest that an 
adequate level of industry knowledge is very costly to acquire for successful venture investing in 
several, unrelated industries. In other words, the costs of diversifying a venture capital portfolio 
outweigh the risk-reducing benefits. 
 This may also hold for diversifying venture funds across portfolio company stage of 
development. It may be in the interest of the venture capitalists to have several portfolio 
companies close to going public (or acquisition) during any particular year. If venture capitalists 
can successfully time the market, then it may be possible to earn higher returns when market 
conditions are more favorable. Since it may take several years to get an entrepreneurial company 
ready for the public markets, having a portfolio of companies diversified across stage of 
development would allow the venture capitalists to take advantage of any windows of 
opportunity that may develop. However, it may be just as difficult to diversify across stage of 
development, as it is to diversify across industry. Firms receiving venture capital in the early 
stages of development may have as little as an idea for a product, while those firms in the later 
stages of development typically have full production of some product and sometimes have 
already achieved profitability. It is likely that firms in later stages of development should need a 
different set of managerial skills than the early stage firms. It may be overly costly to acquire the 
                                                          
36 Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2002) demonstrate that venture capitalist’s exposure to idiosyncratic risk is necessary to 
alleviate principal-agent problems between the venture capitalists and limited partners, and this risk is priced even if 
screening costs alone are accounted for. They suggest that after-investment advice only exacerbates the pricing of 
idiosyncratic risk in venture investments. In either case, their model corroborates the evidence presented in this 
paper that the benefits of specialization outweigh the costs. 
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skills necessary to properly advise a portfolio of entrepreneurial firms diversified across stage of 
development. 
 An emphasis on specialization rather than diversification has also been documented in the 
commercial banking literature. Winton (1999) develops a model in which banks that enter new 
sectors encounter a higher risk of bank failure. He suggests that there may be gains to 
diversification when banks have moderate exposure to downside risk, but that specialization is 
preferred under low or high downside exposure. More recently, Delong (2001) finds that 
announcements of bank mergers that increase banking activity or geographic focus are followed 
by positive abnormal returns, while diversifying mergers do not create value. This is consistent 
with the results of Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2002), who examine the effects of focus 
versus diversification in bank loan portfolio risk and return and find that loan diversification may 
increase overall portfolio risk. 
 I will proceed by classifying my dataset into relatively diversified versus relatively 
specialized venture capital funds by industry and stage of development of portfolio firms. I will 
then examine the consequences of the impact of this diversification choice on venture fund 
success rates in a univariate and multivariate framework. I expect to find that venture capitalists 
that have pursued a strategy of specialization will produce more Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
and acquisitions than those who chose to diversify their portfolios across industry and/or stage of 
portfolio company development. 
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2. Data analysis 
 
 It is useful to look for trends in the data that support prior research concerning venture 
capitalist’s diversification strategy. I will describe the data set before I proceed to the analysis. 
 
2.1 Sample description 
 
 A sample of 1247 U.S. venture capital funds, formed between January 1978 and 
December 1997, was drawn from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) VentureXpert 
database.37 The sample was limited to independent private partnerships that raised funds 
specifically for investment in U.S. portfolio companies and it represents all funds maintained in 
the SDC database with non-missing data on fund size and other fund characteristics.38 I drop 
funds that have invested in fewer than three portfolio companies in order to analyze the effects of 
diversification on portfolio success rates. This leaves me with a total of 1099 venture funds in 
my final sample. Table 13 provides descriptive statistics of the data by year. 
 The SDC VentureXpert database classifies portfolio companies into 10 industries and 
several stages of development. In order to analyze the level of diversification for the sample 
funds, I classify portfolio companies into one of three broad categories of stage of development: 
early, middle or later. Early stages include seed, early and startup stages, first or second stages  
                                                          
37 The VentureXpert database has records as far back as 1962; however, according to Lerner (1995), data collection 
was not a primary focus before mid-1977 for Venture Economics (subsequently acquired by SDC). 
38 Private partnerships account for the vast majority of all venture capital raised over the time period of interest and 
have emerged as the dominant organizational form in the industry. 
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Fund Year
Number of 
Funds
Total Portfolio 
Companies Fund Inflows
Total 
Venture 
Capitalists
1978 14 623 $294.30 181
1979 11 313 227.20 167
1980 26 892 703.80 342
1981 45 1,453 1,135.40 436
1982 53 1,518 1,345.00 496
1983 76 1,900 2,027.50 686
1984 84 2,295 2,593.40 966
1985 57 1,428 1,684.90 634
1986 56 1,206 1,855.40 503
1987 73 1,527 2,807.70 817
1988 64 1,129 3,627.20 650
1989 75 1,206 2,679.10 840
1990 40 603 2,038.10 474
1991 33 404 1,235.30 348
1992 53 1,034 2,851.90 730
1993 65 977 3,295.60 711
1994 72 1,068 4,169.40 775
1995 105 1,444 6,525.90 1,184
1996 87 1,549 7,217.10 1,063
1997 158 2,458 14,756.80 1,922
Total 1247 25,027 63,071.00 13,925
Table 13. Sample description by year (d)
The sample represents all U.S. venture funds, investing in U.S. firms, that are organized as
independent private partnerships, have non-missing data for the time period studied and are found
in the SDC VentureXpert Database in February 2003. Fund inflows are total commitments to
venture funds by investors, measured in millions of 1997 dollars. The total number of portfolio
companies for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital
due to the fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund
may have an investment role in any portfolio firm. Total venture capitalists are proxied by the total
number of executives reported by the funds to SDC.
 
are considered the middle stages, and later stages include the expansion and third stages as well 
as bridge financing.39 
 Ideally I would examine the actual returns from each investment in order to determine the 
relative success across my sample. This data is not publicly available, so I use the eventual 
outcome of the investments as a proxy. Following Gompers and Lerner (1998a, 2000) and 
Santhanakrishnan (2002), a venture capital investment is classified as a success if the portfolio 
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company was acquired or if the company went public through an IPO (or was in registration for 
a public offering).40  Table 14 shows  the distribution of  investment outcomes across the twenty- 
Fund 
Year
Total Portfolio 
Companies
Initial Public 
Offering 
Complete (or 
IPO filing) Acquired Still Private Defunct
1978 623 25.0% 35.2% 34.3% 5.3%
1979 313 25.2 38.0 30.0 6.4
1980 892 23.7 36.1 33.7 6.5
1981 1,453 21.8 34.0 36.8 7.1
1982 1,518 20.7 35.7 37.7 5.9
1983 1,900 26.0 31.3 36.5 6.5
1984 2,295 22.6 34.5 35.7 6.9
1985 1,428 25.5 26.4 43.7 4.6
1986 1,206 24.1 30.2 40.2 5.1
1987 1,527 25.1 27.7 43.2 3.6
1988 1,129 28.9 29.9 39.8 2.3
1989 1,206 27.3 29.7 38.9 4.1
1990 603 29.1 25.7 43.1 3.6
1991 404 33.3 27.4 36.9 4.9
1992 1,034 28.4 26.9 43.8 2.1
1993 977 24.9 26.4 45.4 4.2
1994 1,068 24.1 22.1 50.9 4.4
1995 1,444 21.4 20.8 54.8 5.9
1996 1,549 19.4 18.7 61.4 3.9
1997 2,458 16.8 17.2 62.2 5.9
Table 14. Investment outcomes by year (c) 
The table presents outcomes for the sample portfolio companies by year. The total number of portfolio
companies for any given year overstates the total number of companies receiving venture capital due to the
fact that many venture investments are syndicated and therefore, more than one fund may have an
investment role in any portfolio firm. Less than .5% of the total number of portfolio companies do not fall
into any of these categories due to name change, withdrawn IPO registration, or unknown status.
 
year sample period. In most years, companies receiving venture capital were more likely to 
remain private than any other outcome. This is considered a failed investment and these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
39 Bridge financing is a form of financing that typically is offered to portfolio companies that are expected to go 
public within a year. 
40 Gompers and Lerner (1999, p.23) cite a 1988 Venture Economics study entitled Exiting Venture Capital 
Investments that finds that a $1 investment in a firm that goes public provides a 295% average return over an 
average of 4.2 years. The next best payoff is 40% over 3.7 years, on average, to investments in acquired firms. 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) include only those acquisitions at more than 2 times valuation as successful exits. SDC 
does not maintain the valuation data needed to make that distinction. 
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companies are commonly referred to as “the living dead.”41 Venture capitalists’ portfolio success 
rates are calculated as the ratio of successful venture investments over the total number of 
portfolio firms. 
 
2.2 Univariate analysis 
 
 I first classify funds into those that specialize and those that are well-diversified across 
both industry and stage of development. Since I am only interested in the effects of a relatively 
diversified portfolio versus a relatively specialized portfolio, I divide my sample funds into 
quartiles based on the maximum percentage of fund investments that are in either one industry or 
in one general stage of development. I consider those venture capital funds that are in the bottom 
quartile to be well diversified, while the top quartile represents the specialized group. I confirm 
that venture capitalists have become more specialized by industry and stage of development in 
more recent years. Venture funds in the 1990s have a mean industry concentration of 42% versus 
35% in years prior to 1990, and 29% versus 26% for stage of development. These differences are 
significant at the 1% level using a Mann-Whitney U test for independence of samples. It also 
appears that venture capitalists are more likely to focus on a single industry rather than a 
particular stage of development. Even though I have defined ten industry classes, there is an 
average of 39% of the sample funds’ investments concentrated in only one industry. With only 
three broad categories of portfolio company stage of development defined, I find that the average 
of my measure of fund stage concentration is only 27%. 
 
                                                          
41 From Gorman and Sahlman (1989, p. 237), “Much more common is the phenomenon know (sic) euphemistically 
among venture capitalists as ’the living dead,’ a phrase that refers to venture-backed companies that have failed to 
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Success Rates  (IPO only)
Specialized VC  funds 0.473 0.226
Diversified VC funds 0.498 0.232
Z-Score, Mann-Whitney U 
test    -2.172  (0.030)**    -1.630  (0.103)
Success Rates  (IPO only)
Specialized VC  funds 0.428 0.193
Diversified VC funds 0.490 0.240
Z-Score, Mann-Whitney U 
test    -3.651  (0.000)*    -2.984  (0.003)*
Panel B: Stage of development specialization vs. diversification
Table 15. Univariate analyses of specialization versus diversification
Panel A: Industry specialization vs. diversification
Panel A shows the average success rates for funds that are relatively specialized in a particular portfolio
company industry versus those that are relatively diversified across industries. Panel B compares success
rates for funds that are relatively specialized in a particular portfolio company stage of development versus
those that are diversified across stages. Portfolio success rates are: a) percentage of portfolio funds where a
successful exit is defined as the portfolio company going public through an IPO (or registration for an IPO)
or acquistion of the portfolio company, and b) percentage of portfolio funds where a successful exit is
defined as the portfolio company going public through an IPO only (or registration for an IPO). A Mann-
Whitney U test is used to test for independence of the two samples for each comparison. P-values are in
parentheses.
Success Rates            
(IPO or acquisition)
Success Rates            
(IPO or acquisition)
 
 I next compare average success rates for those funds that are specialized compared to 
those that are diversified. Table 15 contains the results of this analysis. Funds that specialize are 
less successful, on average, than my diversified groups. This is true whether or not I include 
acquisitions as successful exits and for both forms of specialization under investigation, though 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
meet expectations but that nonetheless squeeze out a stable, independent existence.”  
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my results are more significant in the case of specializing in a particular stage of development. 
This preliminary evidence counters my predictions that the benefits of specialization outweigh 
the benefits of diversifying venture fund investments. 
 However, there is reason to suspect that other fund characteristics may be driving the 
results of this univariate analysis. In particular, Gupta and Sapienza (1992) focus on the 
determinants of the venture capitalists’ industry diversification choice and find that early stage 
venture capitalists and smaller sized venture firms are more likely to specialize in an industry. 
Norton and Tenenbaum (1993) confirm the proposition that early stage venture funds are more 
likely to specialize by industry than later stage funds.42 They posit that this is because portfolio 
companies in an early stage of development are more exposed to technical and/or product risk, 
and therefore, information costs will be higher and the need for specialized industry knowledge 
greater. In the next section, I will examine the effects of diversification strategy on success in a 
multivariate framework in order to control for this and other fund characteristics that may 
influence venture capitalists’ success rates. 
 
2.3 Multivariate analysis 
 
 Gompers and Lerner (2000) analyze success rates of firms receiving venture capital 
during periods of increased commitments and find that the portfolio firms’ probability of success 
are independent of fund inflows. While they do not examine success rates in a multivariate 
framework, they do explore potential factors that may influence the valuation of venture 
                                                          
42 We also find evidence supporting this position: mean industry concentration for early stage venture firms is 41% 
versus 37% for all other firms. This is significant at the 1% level under a Mann-Whitney U test for independence of 
samples. 
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investments. The authors show that portfolio companies have higher valuations during periods of 
increased inflows, and the higher valuations are not due to changing company characteristics. 
 Gompers (1996) suggests that the entry of young, less experienced venture capitalists 
leads to a rush to take portfolio companies public. This “grandstanding” hypothesis is supported 
by empirical evidence and is caused by a need to establish a positive reputation in order to raise 
new funds.  Inexperienced venture capitalists cannot credibly signal their ability to investors 
unless they have a track record of successfully bringing firms to IPO. Gompers interprets the cost 
of bringing a firm to IPO early as either a smaller equity stake in the firm or greater underpricing 
at the IPO. Another potential cost lies in the success rates of the other portfolio companies in the 
venture capitalist’s fund. If bringing just one firm public early gives a new venture capitalist the 
ability to raise a follow-on fund, then it may be in the interest of the venture capitalist to focus 
his managerial advice on one or two of the best prospects in the portfolio.43 This implies that the 
venture capitalists’ overall portfolio success rates should fall, all else equal. Seasoned venture 
capitalists should have more success than those who are inexperienced, whether due to the 
grandstanding actions of inexperienced venture capitalists or improvements in human capital 
over time. Age of the venture capitalists’ firm when the funds are raised, and a dummy variable 
for whether the fund is the first fund raised by the venture capital partnership, will control for 
venture capitalists’ experience. 
 Older portfolio companies should be more likely to succeed, particularly if they are later 
stage firms, as much of the uncertainty concerning future revenues ought to be resolved over 
time. Therefore, my model will consider the average number of years since incorporation for the 
portfolio of firms as a control variable. Reputation may be important for the success rates of the 
                                                          
43 Gompers (1996, p. 137) provides anecdotal evidence that substantiates this possibility. 
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venture capitalists’ investments, if entrepreneurs with better projects seek out venture capitalists 
with better reputations. Gompers and Lerner (1998b) suggest that venture capitalists with good 
reputations are able to raise more funds and larger funds. Total fund commitments will be used 
as a proxy for venture capitalist reputation. Industry effects may influence the results if some 
industries are known to have a higher risk/return profile. Portfolio companies are classified by 
the SDC into one of three general industries: information technology, non-high technology, or 
medical/health/life science.  The percentage of the portfolio that consists of information 
technology companies will be used to control for any possible industry effects. 
 Gompers and Lerner (2000) find evidence that portfolio companies located in 
Massachusetts and California are more likely to have increased valuations around periods of 
growth in inflows. A large percentage of venture investment takes place in these locations and an 
even greater percentage of venture funds are located in these two states. I expect that being 
located in MA or CA could increase portfolio success rates either because of network effects or 
because of the lower monitoring costs associated with investment in portfolio firms that are 
located in the same state as the venture capitalist. 
 I also control for the investment focus of the venture capitalists. Funds that focus on early 
stage investments should have less success than those funds that invest in later stage or 
expansion stage firms. A dummy variable is created that equals one if the fund focus is reported 
as either early stage, and zero otherwise. Finally, if exit through IPO is easier during “hot 
markets”, increases in success rates may be due to the easy access to the public markets, rather 
than optimal diversification strategy or any other factor. I control for the market influence on 
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success with the ratio of IPOs that occurred in a hot market to total IPOs. For my purposes, a hot 
market is defined as a year in which more than 600 IPOs occurred.44 
 The multivariate analysis is conducted using a two-limit tobit model. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of successful investments to total investments in the venture portfolio. Since 
the dependent variable is a ratio, the tobit model with limits of zero and one is the appropriate 
choice. An investment is considered successful if the portfolio company was acquired or went 
public through an IPO.45 The model to be tested is 
 
 SUCCESS =  
 
0 1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8
9
_ _
_ _ / _
_ _ _
_
FOCUS PORTFOLIO SIZE FUND SIZE
CO AGE FUND AGE FUND NUMBER
HIGH TECH HOT MARKET CA MA
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β β β β
β β
β β β
β ε
+ + +
+ +
+ + +
+ +
  
 
where, 
 
SUCCESS  is the ratio of successful investments over total investments; an 
investment is considered successful if the portfolio company was 
acquired or went public through an IPO, and zero otherwise; 
FOCUS  is the maximum concentration of the venture fund in one industry 
or stage, i.e., how focused the fund is; 
PORTFOLIO_SIZE is the number of portfolio companies per venture capitalist; 
FUND_SIZE is the total amount of money raised by the venture fund; 
CO_AGE is the average age of the portfolio companies at the time of 
investment; 
FUND_AGE is the age of the venture fund; 
FUND_NUMBER is the number of prior funds raised by the venture capitalists plus 
one; 
                                                          
44  This is the top 25% of years in our sample. 
45 We also run all regressions with IPO only as the definition of success. 
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HIGH_TECH is the percentage of portfolio firms that are information technology 
firms; 
HOT_MARKET is a the percentage of IPOs that occurred in a hot IPO market; 
CA_MA is a dummy variable set equal to one if the fund is located in 
California or Massachusetts, and zero otherwise; 
EARLY_STAGE is a dummy variable set equal to one if the fund focus was  
 on early stage portfolio company development. 
 
 
 
 I find that my multivariate analysis produces results that are similar to my univariate 
tests. Portfolio success rates appear to be independent of industry diversification strategy, and 
positively related to the level of diversification across stages of portfolio company development. 
Table 16 contains the results of this multivariate analysis. The coefficient on my measure of 
stage focus is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that venture funds in my 
sample that have pursued a strategy of specializing in a particular stage of development were less 
successful than those who diversified across stages. 
 These results are not consistent with my predictions. It is possible that my measure of 
diversification is flawed and unable to capture the effect I expect, particularly when considering 
the strategy of diversifying across industries. By my measure, it is possible that a large 
percentage of the portfolio companies fall into one industry, implying that the venture fund is 
specialized, while the fund may only have invested a small percentage of investment dollars in 
those companies. A more precise definition of the degree of diversification would account for the 
dollar amount of each investment. Data limitations prevent us from exploring this possibility 
further. 
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Table 16. Multivariate analyses of specialization versus diversification
Intercept
.346 
(0.000)
* .425 
(0.000)
* .131 
(0.000)
* .178 
(0.000)
*
Industry Focus
.000440 
(0.295)
.000190 
(0.577)
Stage Focus
 -.00202 
(0.000)
*  -.00130 
(0.0061)
*
Portfolio Size
 -.0000723 
(0.923)
 -.0000234 
(0.976)
 -.000493 
(0.440)
 -.000444 
(0.482)
Fund Size
 -.0000205 
(0.842)
 .0000353 
(0.733)
 .0000141 
(0.088)
***  .000176 
(0.035)
**
Average Portfolio 
Company Age
 -.00353 
(0.060)
***  -.00279 
(0.137)
 -.00158 
(0.300)
 -.00104 
(0.495)
Fund Age
.000634 
(0.504)
.0000658 
(0.944)
.00284 
(0.000)
* .00249 
(0.001)
*
High-tech
.0151 
(0.542)
.00767 
(0.754)
 -.0385 
(0.055)
***  -.0427 
(0.031)
**
Hot Market
.272 
(0.000)
* .261 
(0.000)
* .185 
(0.000)
* .179 
(0.000)
*
Fund in CA or MA
.0609 
(0.000)
* .0612 
(0.000)
* .0471 
(0.000)
* .0472 
(0.000)
*
Early Stage Focus
 -.0361 
(0.0639)
***  -.0326 
(0.093)
***  -.0439 
(0.006)
*  -.0417 
(0.009)
*
*,**,*** indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
there were more than 600 IPOs in that year). A dummy variable is set equal to one if the fund is located in MA or CA
and another dummy variable is set equal to one if the fund focused on early stage investments. P-values are in
parentheses.
This table reports the results of two-limit tobit regressions with successful exits defined as IPOs (or registration for an
IPO) or acquisition, or IPOs only. The dependent variable is the ratio of successful exits to total venture fund
investments. Industry (Stage) Focus is the maximum concentration of fund investments in one industry (stage)
category. Portfolio size is the number of portfolio firms per venture fund divided by the number of executives
reported by the funds to SDC. Fund size is the total commitments in millions of 1997 dollars. Average portfolio
company age is the average difference between the year the fund was created and the year each portfolio company was 
founded. Fund age is the difference between the year the fund was created and the venture capitalists' firm founding
year. Fund number is the number of previous funds that the venture capital firm has raised previously plus one. High-
tech is the percentage of the portfolio companies that are information technology firms. Hot market is the ratio of hot
market IPOs to total IPOs (a year is classified as a hot market if 
IPO onlyIPO or Acquisition
 
 The flaw in my proxy for degree of specialization could also explain the relationship 
between success and the degree of concentration in a particular portfolio company stage of 
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development. Some portion of the venture funds that I identify as diversified may be run by 
venture capitalists that specialize in early or middle stage investments. If the successful early 
stage investments continue to develop along the traditional path for portfolio companies, then 
they will become later stage investments before they go public or are acquired. It is likely that 
these early stage specialists would retain their ownership share in the private firm, but transition 
to a more passive investment role as later stage specialists took the lead role in the development 
of the portfolio company. If the early stage venture investor holds on to his shares but does not 
provide capital at the later rounds of financing, then his share of the firm would drop and he 
would have less incentive to actively monitor the firm. 
 It is also possible that the costs of becoming informed about the different stages of 
development and their associated advisory skills are not prohibitively high. This would also 
explain the greater success rates for more diversified (across stages) venture funds. Venture 
investors may rationally determine that the benefits of diversifying across stages of development 
exceed the costs. 
 Finally, the significance of the results that favor the diversification strategy may be 
capturing the effects of funds that appear to be diversified across stages, but in reality have fund 
managers that each offer their own specialization skills. Larger funds could have many partners 
and could potentially diversify across the fund while maintaining early stages, middle stages, and 
later stages divisions. This could potentially be captured with my fund size variable, but there 
may be a more effective way to capture this if there is little correlation between fund size and 
these types of large funds. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
 My analysis of the effects of diversification on venture investment portfolio success rates 
suggests that the decision to specialize in a particular industry rather diversify across industries 
rather has no impact on the portfolio success. Specializing in a particular stage of development 
has been shown to have a negative and significant impact on portfolio success rates. Several 
explanations for these results have been put forth in this essay. More research may be able to add 
to this discussion, though data limitations preclude a comprehensive analysis of this issue 
without additional data sources. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 This manuscript has served to shed some light on the often-murky world of venture 
capital finance. Despite the many problems with the dataset used throughout this analysis, there 
is sufficient evidence put forth that may serve as a building block for future research in the field. 
A more refined set of data would be valuable to help determine the true extent of the effects of 
venture capitalists’ portfolio size, degree of diversification, location, and distance to portfolio 
firms on venture investment success. 
 Each of the ideas raised in this dissertation is fundamentally related to the real economic 
costs that venture capitalists face. Given time constraints, venture capitalists are only capable of 
effectively monitoring some particular number of firms, at some total distance from the venture 
firm, and in only so many unrelated industries. Unless a venture capitalist possesses an 
extraordinary skill set or benefits from innovation in the industry, there must be some decrease in 
benefits to the venture capitalists in the event that they choose to overextend themselves. It is 
likely that some of the reduced benefits arrive in the form of lower returns to the fund, but I have 
demonstrated that in some cases the portfolio success rates fall as well. 
 While it would be beneficial to examine this issue with actual investment returns data, it 
would also be useful to have information regarding the extent of the monitoring that the venture 
capitalists have actually pursued. It is expected that there are numerous venture capitalists in the 
industry that provide little more than financial capital to the entrepreneurs in their portfolio. For
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these types of venture capitalists, you would likely find that any significant results would be 
spurious. Success for such “passive” venture investors would be expected to be a function of 
their ability to screen projects and/or entrepreneurial talent. Unfortunately, it seems more likely 
that venture capitalists will reveal actual returns data than to divulge the particulars concerning 
their management of portfolio investments. 
 This dissertation contributes to the literature in several ways. Given the lack of theoretical 
research regarding the determinants of successful venture capital investing, this manuscript 
suggests several ideas derived from the existing finance and economics literature. Further, 
building off of existing empirical work in the specific area of venture capital finance, I have 
identified a number of significant control variables that are primarily based upon fund and 
portfolio company characteristics. 
The approach taken in this dissertation allowed for a focus on fund characteristics in 
chapters 3 and 5, while the analysis in chapter 4 centered on the characteristics of the 
investments themselves. The focus on fund characteristics logically follows from the fact that I 
was primarily interested in fund-level (or more specifically, venture capitalists’ portfolio-level) 
decision-making in these two chapters. Should the venture capitalist choose to add more 
entrepreneurial firms to his/her portfolio? What type of strategy should the venture capitalist 
adopt: lower risk through diversification, or lower risk by specializing by industry or stage of 
development? These types of questions lend themselves naturally an analysis at the fund level. 
While the roles of distance and location could also be taken into account from the perspective of 
the venture capital funds, they may be just as important from the perspective of the 
entrepreneurs. There is no reason to presume that they are more relevant from the venture 
77 
 
capitalist’s perspective, and here they provide an opportunity to examine the determinants of 
success from the point of view of the entrepreneurs. 
So for control variables in chapters 3 and 5, I use averages of portfolio company 
characteristics and the more informative, actual fund-level data for fund characteristics. In 
chapter 4 I have the benefit of controlling for the actual portfolio company characteristics, at the 
expense of relying on averages for fund data. The overall benefit of using these two different 
methods is that I am able to verify the significance of the control variables used throughout this 
dissertation. 
While many questions remain regarding the determinants of success in venture capital 
finance, this dissertation provides a valuable building block for future research of this topic. Any 
complementary analyses of this issue would appear to require more detailed data. Possible 
sources of this data include surveys, internal documents from venture capitalists themselves, or 
perhaps through filing statements for those portfolio firms that have completed the IPO process. 
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